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ABSTRACT
INDEPENDENT OR UNDECLARED?
The Role of the Undeclared Voter in the New Hampshire Presidential Primary
by
Jennifer E.S. Gupta
University of New Hampshire, May, 2007
This thesis examines whether New Hampshire’s undeclared voters vote in
a similar manner to registered partisans or whether New Hampshire’s voting laws
allow undeclared voters to act more independently. Two main hypotheses focus
on how New Hampshire’s undeclared voters act and whether they are more
volatile than partisans. Data from pre-primary tracking polls and Election Day
exit polls were used to assess actions and volatility. Two variable cross
tabulation was the primary means of data analysis.
The author concludes that New Hampshire’s undeclared voters are more
independent but as involved and interested in politics as their partisan
counterparts. Additionally, while undeclared voters are volatile, this volatility has
little impact on the outcome of the election. Candidates should approach
undeclared voters in the same manner as partisans, especially since nearly 75
percent of undeclared voters lean toward supporting one party over the other the
majority of the time.
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INTRODUCTION

The New Hampshire presidential primary is an institution of American
politics. The perennial first primary of the presidential nominating season,
candidates and the press flock to this small northeastern state for the first
glimpse at what the election season may hold. Candidates spend a significant
amount of time, money, and energy seeking to capture the hearts and minds of
New Hampshire voters. The primary is a piece of presidential folklore. Any
candidate who walks the cold streets of Manchester in January has a story to tell
about the people he met in a state whose passion is politics. A win, or better
than expected finish, in this bell-weather state can give a candidate a great deal
of momentum in the increasingly front-loaded election season (Busch and Mayer
2004). One aspect of the New Hampshire political scene that makes the state
unique is the role that undeclared voters play in the primary election.
New Hampshire’s open primary system, liberal voter election laws, and
growing population have resulted in an increased number of voters registering as
undeclared, choosing not to define a party affiliation (Gregg and Gardner 103104, Smith 2003). New Hampshire’s undeclared voters temporarily declare a
party affiliation on Election Day, enabling them to vote in either party’s primary
(RSA 659:14). In 2004, for the first time in the state’s history, more voters were
registered as undeclared than for either of the two major political parties (State of
New Hampshire, “Presidential Primary Election January 27,
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2004, Registered Voters,” www.sos.state.nh.us/presprim2004/
ppnamessum.htm).
Research has long shown that independent voters are less involved in
politics, less interested in the outcome of elections, not as likely to vote, and
more volatile than registered partisans (Campbell et al, Flanigan and Zingale,
Patterson). Are New Hampshire’s undeclared voters independent or are they
really closet partisans? If they are truly independent, are they as apathetic as
prior research would suggest or is there something about the political culture in
New Hampshire that makes these voters different?
This thesis attempts to determine whether New Hampshire’s undeclared
voters vote in a manner similar to registered partisans or whether New
Hampshire’s voting laws allow undeclared voters to act more independently.
Two main hypotheses focus on how New Hampshire’s undeclared voters act and
whether they are more volatile than partisans. This paper will first explore the
unique aspects on the first-in-the-nation primary, then highlight prior research on
independent voters both nationally and in New Hampshire. The final chapter of
this thesis uses pre-primary tracking polls and Election Day exit polls to examine
the actions and interests of both those who identify themselves as independent
and those who are registered undeclared. The primary means of data analysis is
two variable cross-tabulation.
The research presented here suggests that New Hampshire’s undeclared
voters are more independent but as involved and interested in politics as their
partisan counterparts. Additionally, while undeclared voters are volatile, this

2
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volatility has little impact on the outcome of the election. Candidates should
target undeclared voters and registered partisans in a similar fashion but need to
craft their message with a wider appeal. As undeclared voters have the ability to
swing an election in either direction, it is imperative that candidates who seek the
votes of these undeclared voters understand their motivations and their biases.

3
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CHAPTER 1

THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY

To effectively analyze the New Hampshire presidential primary voter, one
must understand the culture and history of the primary itself. Every four years, a
small, relatively conservative state in the northeast corner of the country holds
the nation’s attention as its citizens cast the first ballots of the presidential
nomination season. New Hampshire residents eagerly await the casting of the
first ballots in Dixville Notch and Hart’s Landing, where residents vote just after
midnight on primary day. Proponents of the New Hampshire primary believe that
the state provides a unique environment that allows any candidate the chance to
become president of the United States. Critics of the primary contend that New
Hampshire is too homogeneous, especially in terms of race and ethnicity, to hold
such an important place in the nomination process. Regardless, the New
Hampshire primary has become a cornerstone of the American presidential
selection process.
The New Hampshire primary itself is less than a century old and has risen
to its current stature only within the last 50 years. In 1913 the New Hampshire
General Court (New Hampshire’s legislative body) approved the establishment of
a primary election as the means of selecting delegates to the national
Democratic and Republican nominating conventions (RSA 653:5). Prior to 1913,
convention delegates were selected by legislative caucus. The creation of the
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primary was an effort by the New Hampshire legislature to make the presidential
nominating process more open and democratic. The quadrennial primary was
scheduled for May of the presidential election year, with voters set to cast ballots
for convention delegates, not directly for the presidential candidates (Gregg and
Gardner 31).
In 1915, a year before the first primary took place, the election was moved
from May to March (RSA 653:9) in order to coincide with the annual town
meeting, saving towns the expense of holding two separate elections. Town
meetings have served as an important means of local government since the
earliest days of statehood and allow residents to debate issues and elect local
leadership. Traditionally, the annual town meeting occurred on the second
Tuesday in March. When New Hampshire held its first presidential primary on
March 14,1916, it was not the first primary in the nation. It did not become so
until 1920 when other, earlier states altered their election dates (Gregg and
Gardner 31-34, 226).
In 1949, the Speaker of the New Hampshire House of Representatives,
Richard Upton, seeking to “make the primary more interesting and meaningful,”
introduced a bill allowing for the direct selection of the candidates in the
presidential primary (Libraries and Archives of New Hampshire’s Political
Tradition, Troubadour 12). Upton’s bill became law (RSA 653:5) in 1952,
cementing the prominence of the New Hampshire primary. The timing of this
change in voting procedure, combined with the increased use of television media
and election polling, vaulted the New Hampshire primary into the spotlight

5
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(Brereton xiv-xv, Gregg and Gardner 34), making it the most closely watched
primary in the nation, and perhaps the most covered election in the world
(Brereton, xiv).
The New Hampshire primary continued to occur in conjunction with local
town meetings until 1972 when Florida moved its primary from May to March in
an effort to share the limelight with New Hampshire. In response to Florida’s
actions, New Hampshire moved both its primary and Town Meeting to the first
Tuesday in March, thus beginning the continuing process of moving the primary
earlier and earlier in the election year in an attempt to remain first.
In 1975, the New Hampshire General Court voted to separate the primary
from the annual town meeting and turned responsibility for its scheduling over to
the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State was to schedule the primary on
either the first Tuesday in March or on the Tuesday prior to any other New
England primary. In 1977, the language was changed again, this time requiring
that the primary remained first in the nation (RSA 653:9). As of the 2004 primary,
New Hampshire remained successful in its efforts; however the state faces
constant challenges (Gregg and Gardner 226-247). The election cycle started
earlier than ever before in 2004, when voters in New Hampshire went to the polls
on January 27th. The New Hampshire primary is now scheduled almost 6 weeks
earlier than it was in 1972.
It remains to be seen what the 2008 election will bring. In August 2006,
the Democratic National Committee voted to hold the Nevada caucus just three
days before the New Hampshire primary and to schedule the South Carolina
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primary a week after New Hampshire’s (Kuhnhenn 20 Aug 2006). While this is
technically within the laws specified by New Hampshire legislature, it will also
require candidates to spend more time campaigning in other states when they
would normally be campaigning in New Hampshire. As of this writing, the 2008
primary is tentatively scheduled for January 22, 2008. This timing will still make
the New Hampshire primary the first in the nation but other primaries are slated
to occur much earlier and closer together than ever before.
Some argue that the New Hampshire primary and its cousin the Iowa
caucus (the nation’s first presidential caucus), gain more prominence as the
nomination cycle becomes increasingly frontloaded and condensed. As more
and more primaries and caucuses are held in the first two months of the election
year, the momentum generated by a win or better-than-expected finished in New
Hampshire can carry a candidate deeper into the nomination process. The
primary schedule has become a fast and furious race to the end where voters
have little time to stop and evaluate candidates once the process starts (Busch
and Mayer 2004). Proponents of the New Hampshire primary argue that the
primary culture in New Hampshire is even more important in such an
environment while critics argue that the state is too small and not diverse enough
to have such a large impact on the selection process. Being first isn’t the only
reason that the New Hampshire primary receives so much media attention,
however. In fact, its rise to prominence has as much to do with the style of
politics in New Hampshire as a date on the calendar.

7
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New Hampshire Political Culture
New Hampshire politics has always been a local affair, due in large
measure to the state’s size. New Hampshire is small in both geography and
population. The state ranks 44th in total land area (Nationalaf/as.gov 20 Nov
2005) and 41st in population, with just over 1.2 million residents as of the 2000
Census (United States Census Bureau 2 Apr 2001). Yet, in contrast to the size
of the state, the New Hampshire House of Representatives is the third largest
representative body in the English-speaking world, lagging behind only the
United States Congress and the British House of Commons. In its history, the
General Court’s largest session held 443 representatives. In 1942, however, a
constitutional amendment limited the size the size of the House to no more than
400 members (State of New Hampshire House of Representatives, “History of
the House”). The 2005-2006 General Court held 400 representatives,
accounting for one representative for approximately every 3000 residents. In
addition to the size of the legislature, New Hampshire also holds elections more
frequently than any other state in the country as its representatives are elected
for two year terms (Libraries and Archives of New Hampshire’s Political Tradition,
“First in the Nation” 5). Many believe that this level of representation in the state
government allows New Hampshire residents more access to their government
and representatives and has instilled a culture of grassroots politics in its voters.
The state’s size and penchant for grassroots politics has created a primary
style that allows voters to get to know the candidates. As a result, voters in the
Granite State are highly engaged. A report released by the Library and Archives
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of New Hampshire’s Political Tradition in February 2001, stated that 75% of
voting age citizens said they voted in the 2000 presidential primary, 74% paid
“some” or “a lot” of attention to the primary itself, 68% watched one or more
televised debate, 20% shook hands with a candidate, 13% attended a campaign
event and 9% made a campaign contribution. “When it came time to vote in
February 2000, 85 percent of registered Republicans and 74 percent of
registered Democrats went to the polls, about 50 percent higher turnout than the
national average” (2-3).1 Since the voters take the electoral process seriously,
they expect the same of those who hope to be president. Candidates are
expected to make themselves personally visible at functions and events.
In New Hampshire, “politics is retail, not wholesale” (Rueter 276). A study
conducted by researchers at Dartmouth College during the 1996 primary found
that 18.5% of voters had contact with at least one candidate while only 5.9% of
the national electorate had the same opportunity. The same study also found
that meeting a candidate “increases favorability for that candidate.” The study
concluded that “candidate contacts are an important influence on primary voters’
knowledge and attitudes” (Vavreck et al 601-604). Advocates of New
Hampshire’s first-in-the-nation primary maintain that New Hampshire is one of
the few places where candidates are required to get up close and personal with
the voters.

1 N ew Hampshire voter turnout has long been calculated b y the Secretary o f State. The calculations
conducted b y this o ffice are a comparison o f the number o f ballots cast divided by the number o f voters on
the checklist and do not include same day voter registrations. There w ill be a discrepancy between the
quoted voter turnout statistics reported in this thesis and those calculated b y the author. For the means o f
this research, the author has calculated voter registration to be the number o f ballots cast divided by the
number o f voters on the checklist plus those voters who register at the polls.
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Television has not replaced the need for buttons, bumper stickers, phone
calls, door to door canvassing, field offices, lawn signs, posters and
handshaking. Candidates still find it necessary to speak to small groups
of people...People regularly [come] into campaign offices looking for
buttons or issue papers (Rueter 276).
This type of campaign is not possible in states with larger populations or
geography. Primary supporters argue that if New Hampshire wasn’t first,
candidates would likely ignore the state all together and the nation as a whole
would lose an important piece of the vetting process. Forcing candidates to
know the voters is good for democracy, they argue (Libraries and Archives of
New Hampshire’s Political Tradition, “First in the Nation”).
Politically speaking, New Hampshire voters have a reputation for being
both independent and conservative. Critics of the New Hampshire primary often
focus on the conservative bent of voters while ignoring their more strident belief
in independence. Niall Palmer, in his book The New Hampshire Primary and the
American Electoral Process, goes to great lengths to describe the political
attitudes of New Hampshire voters. He repeatedly refers to New Hampshire
voters as independent and libertarian. Palmer finds that voters have “flexible”
attitudes, are politically well educated, and are highly involved due to the
tremendous media attention directed at New Hampshire’s first-in-the-nation
primary (42).
This independence is reflected in New Hampshire laws which allow
citizens to register to vote without declaring an alignment with a major political
party. According to the state’s voting laws, when registering to vote, a citizen can
choose to declare an affiliation with a major political party or can remain

10
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undeclared. A New Hampshire undeclared voter is one “who is registered as a
member of no political party" (RSA 652:16-a). Leading up to the 2004 primary,
undeclared voters were the single largest voting block in New Hampshire,
outnumbering both Republicans and Democrats.
Table 1.1
2004 New Hampshire Primary Voter Registration
(does not include same-day voter registration)
Registered Republicans

246,529

34%

Registered Democrats

199,386

28%

Registered Undeclared

270,052

38%

Source: State of New Hampshire, “Presidential Primary Election, January 27, 2004, Registered Voters”
Reprinted with permission New Hampshire Secretary of State

The number of undeclared voters has been steadily increasing since 1992 with
newcomers more likely to register as undeclared than long-time New Hampshire
residents (Smith, “Political Landscape”). Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
voters register as undeclared because they believe their party identification is a
private matter. By registering as undeclared, the voter can maintain his or her
“independence.”
Another important piece of New Hampshire primary culture is the ease of
entry for those with presidential aspirations. New Hampshire primary rules allow
almost any candidate to appear on the ballot, leaving the dream of becoming
president open to almost anyone. In their book Why New Hampshire?. Former
New Hampshire Governor Hugh Gregg and longtime Secretary of State William
Gardner claim that New Hampshire “remains the quickest, easiest, least
expensive and most effective place to start the presidential contest” (Gregg and
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Gardner ix). In order to be included on the ballot, a candidate need only pay the
$1000 entry fee and meet the constitutional requirements to be President of the
United States.
In 1992, there were 64 candidates listed on the ballot. Added to the
“write-ins” not listed on the ballot, there was a record number of...fringe
or lesser-knowns who paid the $1,000 to participate. In that group were
ten authors, three lawyers, two businessmen, two software
programmers, two mayors, two registered nurses, a minister, a doctor, a
certified public accountant, an aircraft mechanic, an anti-AIDS activist, a
former FBI agent, a professional comedian, a building contractor, a
public relations counselor, a former nun, and investment consultant, a
real estate broker, a process server and a sign language interpreter
(Gregg and Gardner 75).
Other states often impose additional requirements such as higher entry fees or
petitions of support for those candidates seeking to have their name on the
ballot.
In addition to the low entry fees, New Hampshire’s small size and
economy make the state an inexpensive place to campaign. New Hampshire is
an easy state to travel and has an extensive tourism infrastructure. There are no
state sales or income taxes, a single media market (WMUR in Manchester), an
abundance of local political activists willing to donate their time, and a focus on
personal contact rather than expensive television or radio advertisements. Any
candidate willing to set up camp in the state for several months and meet with
voters to listen to their concerns will have the opportunity to gain the support of
the electorate (Gregg and Gardner 9-10).
For all of these reasons, New Hampshire is the springboard which has
catapulted many candidates to national prominence. Former Georgia Governor,
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Jimmy Carter, arrived in New Hampshire in 1974 as a virtual unknown and spent
almost two years in the state embarking on a true grassroots campaign.
The 1976 campaign that carried Carter to the White House came to be
regarded as a model for future New Hampshire efforts. The former
governor, with no national political standing, had demonstrated the
potential of the first primary for creating a cycle of dollar-generating
media interest which could bring the smallest, most poorly resourced
campaign through the lengthy series of primary tests (Palmer 18).
Carter’s New Hampshire win gave him a much needed boost of momentum and
helped propel him to the White House.
While a win in New Hampshire can clearly help one’s chances of winning
the nomination and eventually the presidency, a better-than-expected New
Hampshire finish can do the same. New Hampshire is the state that earned
Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton the nickname “Comeback Kid.” In January 1992,
as the New Hampshire primary campaign came to a close, allegations of adultery
and draft-dodging plagued the candidate. In an all-out blitz, the Clinton
campaign gained ground in the final days of the campaign and finished a strong
second. Clinton claimed a “moral victory” in the state and used the results to
reinvigorate the Democratic Party and his campaign (Palmer 24-25). Clinton
never forgot the role New Hampshire played in this successful presidential bid,
returning often to the state. He continues to stand behind New Hampshire in its
bid to remain first in the nation (Kuhnhenn 20 Aug 2006).
It is impossible to extol the political virtues of the New Hampshire primary
without also mentioning the numerous benefits that state receives as a result of
its “First-in-the-Nation” status. The state garners a tremendous amount of
positive, free press from the primary. Yet contrary to those who believe that the

13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

primary is an economic boon, the primary brings in $264 million in revenue to the
state in a primary year or only six-tenths of one percent of the gross state product
(Libraries and Archives of New Hampshire’s Political Tradition, “First in the
Nation” 5). This revenue comes in the form of lodging and transportation
expenses, salaries paid to campaign workers, and media buys. The Library and
Archives of New Hampshire’s Politics Tradition, in its report, First in the Nation:
The New Hampshire Primary, states that “The New Hampshire
Primary...Engages our residents in the political process...Stimulates small
business development...Enhances our reputation worldwide...Creates
community traditions.” While New Hampshire clearly benefits from its first-in-thenation status, the primary’s staunchest supporters believe the primary benefits
the nation as a whole.

New Hampshire’s Voting Laws and Voters
New Hampshire’s voter registration laws mirror the state’s independent
streak, not only in their uniqueness but in their results. When registering to vote
for the first time, New Hampshire residents can declare themselves as either a
Democrat, a Republican, or choose to remain undeclared. In primary elections,
voters who previously registered as undeclared may vote in either party’s primary
by momentarily changing their party affiliation to the party of their choice. Prior to
1993, undeclared voters who voted in a party primary on Election Day had to
return to their town or city hall prior to the next primary election to change their
party affiliation back to undeclared. If the voter neglected to do so, the voter’s
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registration remained with the party of the primary in which they last voted. In
1993, New Hampshire altered its voting laws to allow voters to change their party
affiliation status back to undeclared immediately after casting a ballot (RSA
654:34). This change in the election law made it even more enticing to register
as undeclared as there is virtually no penalty for doing so. The law allows New
Hampshire’s undeclared voters to always vote in a relevant primary and may be
a significant reason why the number of voters registered as undeclared has risen
so dramatically in recent years (Smith, “Perils” 254-255).
Table 1.2
New Hampshire Voter Registration 1988-2000

Democrats
Republicans
Undeclared

Total

1988
197,409
30.4%
252,720
38.9%
199,651
30.7%

1992
219,773
33.4%
257,317
39.1%
180,616
27.5%

1996
206,273
28.9%
276,129
38.7%
230,834
32.4%

2000
224,295
26.2%
301,844
35.3%
328,556
38.5%

649,780

657,706

713,236

854,695

Source: New Hampshire Political Library, “Voter Registration Compared O ver Tim e”
Reprinted with permission New Hampshire Political Library

Another aspect of New Hampshire’s voting laws that encourages voter
participation concerns Election Day voter registration. New Hampshire’s election
laws allow previously unregistered voters to register at the polling station on
Election Day. The voter is then considered registered for all subsequent
elections as either an undeclared voter or as a registered member of a specific
political party. The only exception to the open voter registration laws in New
Hampshire relates to changing party declaration at any time other than on
Election Day. A registered voter can change his or her party registration at any

15

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

time EXCEPT between the first Wednesday in June and the day before the state
primary in September (RSA 654:34, IV).
The New Hampshire primary is a prominent event in the presidential
nominating process due to both its position in the nominating calendar and the
type of campaigning that takes place in the state. Because of increasingly open
voter registration laws more New Hampshire voters have chosen not to align
themselves with a particular political party, instead registering as undeclared.
The combination of the attention placed on the primary and the state’s open voter
registration laws encourage many voters to participate. Since such a large
percentage of the population remains undeclared, it is important for any
presidential candidate campaigning in New Hampshire to understand the psyche
of the undeclared voter and address the concerns of this large voting block.
These voters can play a significant role in selecting the parties’ nominees.
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CHAPTER 2

INDEPENDENT OR UNDECLARED?

Since the advent of democratic elections in the United States, those
concerned with elections and voters have attempted to understand how
individuals behave once they enter the voting booth. What influences voters’
decisions to align themselves with a particular political party? Do they approach
each election with an open mind or do they have preconceived ideas? Is party
affiliation or candidate ideology more important? Are American political parties
becoming irrelevant? Some of the most provocative research in voting behavior
addresses these very questions. More recently, as the number of independent
voters has increased nationwide, political scientists have attempted to
understand what motivates this particular voting block. Are these voters truly
independent or do they lean toward regularly supporting one specific political
party? Should political candidates address these voters differently than party
loyalists? Do independent voters have the ability to significantly influence
elections? As the history of the New Hampshire presidential primary has shown,
undeclared voters represent a significant portion of the state’s voting population.
Any presidential candidate who hopes to win in New Hampshire needs to
understand the effects these voters can have on an election.
Historically, political scientists have focused on several key areas of
research related to partisanship and independent voters. Researchers have

17

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sought to understand why people are drawn to political parties, why partisanship
appears to be declining over time and what impact this has on the electoral
system, what happens to voters when they become unaligned with a political
party, and how these unaligned or independent voters act when they don’t have
a party to guide them. While the conclusion drawn by researchers over the last
50 years may have evolved, the general themes remain constant.
In the middle of the twentieth century, the United States was a decidedly
two-party system and party affiliation was the primary determinate in how an
individual would vote in a given election. The typical American voter was
remarkably stable in his political attitudes, retaining his or her party affiliation
from one election to the next and lending considerable strength to the two-party
system. Research showed that the stronger an individual’s allegiance to a
particular party, the more involved that voter tended to be in politics in general
(Campbell et al 224-225). During this period of political history, research focused
on what differentiated one distinct group of voters from another.
By the mid 1970s, many political scientists saw an erosion in the stability
of the American electorate. Whether brought about as a result of the tumultuous
1960s and 1970s or a true, long-term weakening of the two-party system, many
believed that the decline in partisanship was a sign of trouble for the American
political system. In The Changing American Voter (1976) Norman Nie, Sydney
Verba, and John Petrocik stated “[p]erhaps the most dramatic political change in
the American public over the past two decades has been the decline of
partisanship” (235).
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If the 1950s and 1960s were a time of strong and meaningful party
affiliation these authors argued, the 1970 were a time of disengagement and
negativity toward political parties. In the ‘50s and ‘60s, “[p]artisanship appeared
to be a force mobilizing citizens into political life” (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 235).
However, by the 1970s the political landscape appeared to have changed
dramatically.
Throughout the 1952-1964 period, approximately 23% of the electorate
considered themselves to be Independents. This figure increased to
29% in 1968 and further to about 35% in 1972 and thereafter. By 1980,
Independents—who were less numerous than the supporters of either
party during the 1952-64 steady-state period—numbered as many
identifiers as Democrats (Carmines, Mclver, and Stimson, 377).
It seemed that one could no longer evaluate the political landscape simply by
understanding the party affiliation of the general public.
Nie, Verba, and Petrocik’s research on declining partisanship found that in
the 1970s fewer citizens had steady and strong psychological identification with a
party; party affiliation was less of a guide to electoral choice; parties were less
frequently used as standards of evaluation; parties were less frequently objects
of positive feelings on the part of citizens; and partisanship was less likely to be
transferred from generation to generation (235). The conclusions were based on
survey research which showed a decrease in the number of self-identified strong
partisans between 1964 and 1974, and a resulting increase in the number of self
described independents. By 1974, the number of people who called themselves
independents exceeded both strong and weak partisans, with strong partisans
the smallest of the three categories. “[These] figures indicate a clear erosion of
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the strength of party affiliation in the American Public” (237). For Nie, this trend
was likely to have negative consequences on the American political system.
The common belief was that the change in party affiliation would affect
how voters behaved by changing their perception of candidates. No longer were
voters likely to vote for a candidate simply because of his or her party ties.
Neither were voters likely to have positive feelings for a given political party.
Partisanship, however, was still important, even if the power of the party was
declining. Both parties suffered similarly with the loss of true followers, leading
neither to gain at the expense of the other (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 240-244).
“Nonpartisanship, according to numerous studies, is found disproportionately
among voters who have entered the electorate since the 1964 election
(Carmines, Mclver, and Stimson 378). The unanswered question in these
studies remained whether partisanship was truly declining or whether voters
simply chose to identify themselves differently. One could argue that the
tumultuousness of the 1960s and 1970s encouraged this spirit of independence.
In fact, beginning in the late 1970s, scholars began to challenge the
research conducted by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, even going so far as to discredit
the findings. Challengers cite a change in survey question wording as the reason
for the apparent change in voter behavior. George Bishop, Alfred Tuchfarber,
Robert Oldendick, and Stephen Bennett repeatedly argued that the changes in
voting behavior noted by Nie where due to the change in question wording by the
Michigan Survey Research Center beginning in 1964. These authors argue in
several different publications that Americans did not suddenly change from party-
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centered to issue-centered voting. Rather, the change in question wording
highlighted issues over party or vice versa.
Had the research relied on surveys worded in the same manner, Bishop,
Tuchfarber, Oldendick, and Bennett argue, Campbell and Nie likely would have
reached similar conclusions. “[Campbell] probably would have found that issue
voting explained more of the variance in vote than the 1956 items led them to
believe; thus they might have rated it nearly as important as party identification...”
(Bishop, Tuchfarber, Oldendick 266). Alternately, had Nie et al relied on the
same surveys as Campbell, they likely have found that voters were no more or
less issue-centric that those in Campbell’s study. Though most of the research
challenging Nie’s conclusions focused on issue-centered as opposed to partycenter voting, and does not directly address how voters classify their partisan
tendencies, one can assume the two are related and that the decline in
partisanship was significantly overstated. Much of the work published in the
wake of Nie’s research steadfastly asserts that voting behavior remained virtually
unchanged in the 1960 and 1970s (Bishop, Oldendick, Tuchfarber, and Bennett
1978 and 1979, Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1978, Sullivan, Piereson,
Marcus, and Feldman 1979).
Despite the research referred to directly above, many continue to decry
the loss of partisanship and increase in voter apathy. While “most voters have a
basic and quite stable loyalty to one party or the other... and partisanship is the
most important influence on political opinions and voting behavior” (Flanigan and
Zingale 51), “declining party loyalty is apparent with a decrease in the intensity of
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partisanship” (65). With this in mind, the overriding questions are: what is
causing the decrease in partisanship? Is the decline in partisanship causing
apathy or rather is a disengaged electorate growing apathetic, in turn causing a
decline in partisanship? The disengagement of the electorate could be caused
by many factors outside of the decline of the two major political parties, or it could
simply be overstated.
In 1952, Angus Campbell and researchers from the National Election
Studies (NES) at the University of Michigan’s Center for Political Studies
designed the measure of party affiliation that has been used by nearly all political
scientists since. The survey metric allows researchers to differentiate between
seven types of partisan supporters and independents voters. The measure of
party affiliation is a survey-based question, asking respondents to rate
themselves on a continuum of party affiliation. Respondents are first asked to
classify themselves as a Democrat, Republican or independent. Those who
initially classify themselves as either Democrat or Republican are then asked to
further identify themselves as strong or weak followers of their given party.
Voters who classify themselves as independent are asked if they lean toward
supporting one party over the other (Campbell et al 225-227). This survey
structure allows researchers to delve more deeply and consistently into party
identification.
However, while early research on party affiliation acknowledged the
existence of independent voters and made a distinction between those who lean
toward supporting a particular political party and those who truly are
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independent, few delved deeply into these intricacies. While most major studies
concluded that there were clearly subcategories within each of the three major
groupings, many dismissed the significance of exploring those differences more
fully, believing that it only complicated the issue of partisanship (Flanigan and
Zingale 79). In the past decade, however, researchers have increasingly found
that the differences between weak and strong partisans, and leaning and true
independents, are too great to be ignored. If, as a culture, we are indeed facing
the decline of the two-party political system, it is imperative that we understand
these differences and that our political system and candidates make the
appropriate changes. If they do not, voter apathy will likely increase and political
involvement decrease.
Much of the research that follows in this paper acknowledges the findings
of Bruce Keith et al in The Mvth of the Independent Voter (1992). Keith asserts
that only one-third of voters who classify themselves as independent are truly
without ties to a political party (xvi). The Mvth of the Independent Voter
concludes that the so-called partisan decline in the United States is overstated
and that the assumptions about declining partisanship are the result of erroneous
survey construction rather than a true understanding of the American electorate.
Focusing mostly on independent voters, the author asserts that independent
voters should be separated into three distinct categories (Republican-leaning
independents, Democrat-leaning independents, and true independents). Without
fully appreciating this differentiation, the authors argue, one cannot understand
the partisanship of the American electorate nor can one understand the motives
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of the independent voter (4-5). This research is reiterated by Andrew Smith,
Alfred Tuchfarber, Eric Rademacher, and Stephen Bennett in a 1995 article titled
“Partisan Leaners are NOT Independents.” Smith et al argue that scholars and
pollsters who do not investigate the intensity of partisanship mislead the public
into believing that partisanship is declining. If leaning independents are classified
as partisans rather than independents, the percentage of independent voters in
the American electorate drops significantly, to the point where independents
represent a negligible percentage of the population (1995). Indeed, if Keith and
Smith are correct, overall partisanship may not be in decline, but the strength of
people’s ties to parties might be waning. In this reality, parties are still relevant
and the American two-party system still functions.
Whether voters are classified in a three-tier system (Democrat,
Republican, or independent) or a seven-tier system (strong and weak partisans,
as well as leaning and unaligned independents), partisanship is still the only
quantitative way that scholars can analyze voting behavior and actions. While
the seven-tier system provides more detail, research conducted on both scales is
essential to understanding the current state of American politics.

What does partisanship really mean?
Very few would argue against the claim that there has been a decline in
voter turnout or political activism in the last several decades. Additionally, a look
at voter checklists suggests that, as more states open up their primary systems,
fewer voters decide to align themselves with one particular party, instead
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choosing to remain independent or undeclared. Given this trend, how can we
expect voters to act and how can elected officials best connect with their
constituents?
There exists in America an idealized notion of an independent, self-reliant
person, one who is immune to the pressures of society and who thinks for him or
herself. Do independent voters live up to this idealism? Neither Campbell et al
nor Flanigan and Zingale believe so.
Major voting studies contend that the popular image of political
independents as intelligent, informed, dispassionate evaluators of
candidates, parties, and issues is mistaken. Studies from the Bureau of
Applied Social Research and the Survey Research Center have
supported the view that partisans of both parties are better informed and
more concerned with politics than are the independents (Flanigan and
Zingale 75-76).
The American Voter boldly asserts that “[t]he ideal of the Independent citizen,
attentive to politics, concerned with the course of government, who weighs the
rival appeals of a campaign and reaches a judgment that is unswayed by
partisan prejudice” does not exist (Campbell et al 230). For these scholars,
independent voters are much less involved in the political process and much less
concerned with the outcome of elections than are their partisan counterparts.
Regardless of how voters classify themselves, it is their impact on the
democratic system that is most important. Most research concludes that, in
general, partisans have a greater interest in political issues and are more
concerned about the outcome of elections than independents. Partisans also
tend to vote in greater numbers and be more confident in their vote choice than
are independent voters. Pure independents are even less involved than are their
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leaning counterparts, though leaning independents tend to be more involved than
weak partisans. The two key themes explored in this paper relate to the actions
and volatility of independent and undeclared voters when compared with partisan
voters. For the purposes of this research, actions are defined by political
involvement and voter turnout. Volatility is a measure of how often voters
change their mind during campaign cycle and how open they are to new
possibilities.

Political Involvement
In contrast to the ideal notion of independent voters mentioned above,
most research shows that independent voters are less involved and less
interested in politics than partisans. Campbell found that independents as a
whole “have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues, the image of the
candidates is fainter, their interest in the campaign is less, [and] their concern
over the outcome is relatively slight...” (230). However, when the seven-tier
system of partisan identification is used, there are clear differences in the way
partisans and independents act. Keith et al specifically analyzed the civic
involvement, voting behavior, and political attitudes of these voters and found
clear differences between pure and leaning independents in terms of political
interest and involvement. Pure independents tend not to be involved or
interested in politics while leaners are more involved and interested than weak
partisans. Leaning independents are also more involved in campaign activity
and more generally knowledgeable about politics than are pure independents

26

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(38-53). Smith et al also finds clear differences between the behavior of pure
and leaning independents (Smith et al 10-11).
Later research into leaning independents sought even further
differentiation in the seven-point system defined by the National Election Studies.
Jack Dennis designed another series of survey questions to be used in concert
with the NES scale. Within the typical subcategories of independents and
leaning independents, he further classifies voters as either unattached, regular
independents, or independent partisans. Dennis finds that all leaners are “more
politically involved, attentive, and aware than are weak partisans; and the
[independent partisan subcategory of leaners] are more like strong
partisans...than are either weak partisans or other leaners" (Dennis 274). This
research, like that of Keith, suggests that the cries of partisan decline have likely
been overstated.

Voter Turnout
In addition to political interest, voter turnout is another key aspect of voter
involvement. Declining turnout is a major research platform for many political
scientists. Indeed, some of the research cited here attempts to understand the
reason for such low turnout among American voters. As parties are the primary
means for turning out the vote, if voters are less aligned with parties, there is less
of a pull for unaligned voters to show up at the polls. Additionally, if the previous
research is correct, independent voters are less interested and less active in
politics and therefore less likely to care about voting.
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Thomas Patterson spends much of his 2002 book on declining voter
turnout, The Vanishing Voter, linking the decline in partisanship with the decline
in voter turnout. For Patterson, the link between voter turnout and party
identification lies in the commitment of independent voters. Since partisans are
more likely to vote than independents, as the number of independent voters has
increased, the overall turnout of the American voting public has decreased.
“When it comes to turnout...there is a substantial gap between independent
leaners and strong partisans. In National Election Studies surveys, independent
leaners have consistently reported turnout rates below those of strong partisans
and, in the surveys where reported voting has been checked against actual
voting records, the difference is roughly 10 percent” (Patterson 43).
Patterson does find, however, that the New Hampshire primary bucks
many of the voter turnout trends he discusses. As the first state in the nation to
hold a primary, New Hampshire avoids much of the apathy seen in the rest of the
country. When New Hampshire votes at the front of the process, voter interest is
still high in the campaign. Candidates focus much of their time and attention in
New Hampshire as the momentum generated from a better-than-expected finish
can vault a candidate to later success. Additionally, New Hampshire voters
aren’t yet tired of politics as the campaign season is just getting under way ( H I 112). One assumes from Patterson, that these conclusions about participation in
early states apply evenly across the partisanship scale with partisans and
independent voters alike more involved in the election process in those early
primary states.
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The Mvth of the Independent Voter (Keith et al) also evaluated
participation in presidential primaries in order to understand the independent
voter. Since primaries are party nominating vehicles, one might assume that
voters who do not outwardly align themselves with a particular political party
would not participate in primary elections. The authors find that voters who
consistently lean toward supporting one party were as likely as partisans to vote
in a presidential primary though not as likely to vote in their particular party’s
primary. Pure independents did not show the same participation trends (80-82).

Volatility
Explored and analyzed repeatedly by scholars and emphasized by the
media, the volatility of independent voters is a final important aspect of
participation. The assumption has long been that independent voters have
weaker or no ties to a particular political party, are more apt to waver in their
support for a particular candidate, and are more open to the influences of
campaign rhetoric and media coverage. Political scholars, pollsters and the
media often view independent voters as less educated about the political process
in general and individual candidates more specifically. This perceived lack of
education and involvement allows the volatility of the systems to impact these
voters to a greater extent. The distinction between pure and leaning
independents may be more important in discussions of volatility than in any other
discussion related to independent voters.
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Studies show that pure independents are decidedly volatile. The
American Voter study found that only 16 percent of those who report they do not
lean toward one party over the other always voted for the same party. “When the
frequency of voting turnout is considered, the proportion of extreme
Independents who have voted only for the candidates of one party is not greater
than we would expect it to be by chance alone” (Campbell et al 228). However,
younger voters, who may be more likely to register as undeclared vote for the
same party more frequently.
Nie, Verba, and Petrocik also analyzed voting data from national, state
and local elections to more fully understand the rate of crossover voting, finding
an increased rate of split ticket voting. The authors believe this to be related to
the decline in partisanship:
[t]he proportion of citizens who are inconsistent in their vote - sometimes
voting for the presidential candidate of one party, sometimes for the
other - can be expected to rise with the rise in the proportion of
Independents in the population. Their votes are more likely to move from
party to party (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 239).
Flanigan and Zingale continued the research of Nie, Verba, and Petrocik in their
1994 book, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, covering elections from
1976 to 1992. They concur that independent voters are a more volatile voting
block than partisan voters and are more likely to vote for independent or thirdparty candidates. For Flanigan and Zingale, the volatility of the independent
voter opens the door for new political parties to join the political landscape.
Should that happen, they argue, these independent voters would be a prime
recruiting base for new party candidates (79).
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Keith challenges the prevailing notion that independent voters are, on the
whole, a volatile group. He finds that pure independents are volatile and tend to
vote for the leading candidate. Leaning independents, however, act more like
partisans. “They display an impressive tendency to vote for the candidate of the
party they feel closer to; indeed, in presidential elections they are generally more
loyal to their party than weak partisans” (emphasis in original) (65). This loyalty,
according to the author, proves that the majority of independent voters are not
neutral. However, this loyalty only extends so far, as “leaners” are more likely to
desert their party in House elections. Keith attributes this crossover to higher
involvement and knowledge rather than true volatility.
[Independent leaners] vote as they do because they are partisan, not
neutral, about the two parties. Their partisanship is evident not only in
their voting but in their choice of presidential primary elections, the
stability of their party identifications, and their attitudes toward the two
parties. In all these respects they resemble outright partisans and differ
from Pure Independents, who profess no attachment to either party
(Keith etal 111).
Clearly research presented on the seven-point partisanship scale
offers valuable insight into independent voters that is applicable to New
Hampshire.

New Hampshire Undeclared Voters
All of the data presented thus far derives from research conducted outside
the state of New Hampshire. While these conclusions can be applied to politics
in general, local circumstances can certainly alter behavior. Due to New
Hampshire’s voting laws and the stature of the New Hampshire primary, these
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general characterizations may only extend so far. There has been very little
research conducted on the role of the undeclared voter in New Hampshire. The
only research to focus directly on New Hampshire’s undeclared voters was
conducted during the 2000 presidential primary by a research group from
Dartmouth College in Hanover, NH. As discussed in the chapter on the New
Hampshire Primary, New Hampshire’s open primary laws allow voters to register
as undeclared and wait until primary election day to determine which primary to
participate in. In “Sheep in Wolves Clothing: Undeclared Voters in New
Hampshire’s Open Primary,” Linda Fowler, Constantine Spiliotes, and Lynn
Vavreck, sought to determine whether the state’s undeclared voters made the
primary more volatile. They found “few differences in the way the two groups of
voters [registered and undeclared] responded to campaign stimuli” (159).
Fowler, Spiliotes and Vavreck’s conclusions focused on several areas.
The authors state that “there do not appear to be systematic differences between
partisan registrants and undeclared registrants in terms of their probability of
voting in a party primary or of voting for a particular candidate” (160).
Additionally, direct contact with the candidates seemed to influence partisans and
undeclared voters in the same manner. One significant and discernable
difference found in the study was that phone contact by a Republican campaign
increased the likelihood that a Republican would vote in his or her own primary
while it increased the likelihood that an undeclared voter would vote in the
Democratic one.
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The Dartmouth research concludes that “there is very little evidence that
undeclared voters in New Hampshire behaved much differently than registered
party voters—both groups gave a victory to John McCain” (Fowler et al, 162).
Had the Republican primary been closed to all but registered Republicans,
McCain still would have won the primary. Only undeclared female voters were
more likely to vote for George Bush than McCain in the Republican primary.
While the authors did record a high level of movement within the election cycle,
in the end there was no real impact. Fowler, Spiliotes and Vavreck believe that
primaries themselves are volatile and that open primaries do not add to the
volatility.
Primaries are volatile because voters and candidates are operating in a
low information environment in which new facts and new impressions
count heavily. Undeclared voters are subject to all of these
uncertainties... but so are registered partisans. Allowing undeclared
voters to vote in nominating elections expands the size of the primary
electorate, but does not seem to make an already unstable situation
decidedly worse (162).2
For the most part, this research also suggests that campaigns can treat
undeclared and registered partisans in a similar manner.
While the research on the role of independent voters is mixed, there is at
least a portion of this voting block that is not truly independent. The most recent
research which focuses solely on the independent voter nationally or New
Hampshire’s undeclared voters finds that the majority of independent/undeclared
voters act in a clearly partisan manner. When examining issues such as voter
turnout, political participation, and voter volatility, leaning independents are often
2 Voters in early primary states often operate in lower information environments than those in later states as
the process is just beginning. N ew Hampshire, however, m ay be immune to this information void because
o f the media attention directed toward the N ew Hampshire primary.
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more stable than weak partisans. One would assume, given New Hampshire’s
open primary and inclusive voting laws, the state’s reputation for independence,
and current political thought regarding independent voters, that New Hampshire’s
undeclared voters are simply that... .undeclared. Not forced to align themselves
with any particular party, these voters choose, for whatever reason, to remain
publicly unaffiliated until they cast their ballots. Are New Hampshire’s undeclared
voters closet partisans, the idealized independent voters who are “intelligent,
informed, dispassionate evaluators of candidates, parties, and issues” (Flanigan
and Zingale 75-76), or Campbell and Nie’s uninvolved, uninterested, and
unreliable voters? An in-depth evaluation of the 2000 and 2004 New Hampshire
presidential primaries should shed some light on these voters.
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CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF THE UNDECLARED VOTER
IN THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY

Do undeclared voters in the New Hampshire presidential primary vote in a
manner similar to registered partisans or do New Hampshire’s voter registration
laws allow undeclared voters to act more independently? This research thesis
sets out to answer that very question by posing and testing two main hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is that in the New Hampshire primary undeclared voters act
like registered partisans but choose not to publicly declare their party affiliation.
The second hypothesis is that New Hampshire’s undeclared voters are more
volatile than registered partisans, often making their choice at the last minute.
In order to validate the first hypothesis, the research must demonstrate
little statistical difference between the actions of voters registered under one of
the two major parties and those registered as undeclared. For the purpose of
this research “actions” relate to pre-primary interest in the election, attention paid
to debates, effort made to see candidates, and the voters’ likelihood of voting.
Additionally, voter turnout on the day of the election is useful in judging how the
various subsets of the electorate act as a whole.
In order to substantiate the second hypothesis, I have analyzed which
candidates each voting block preferred in the days leading up to the primary as
well as how certain they were to support that candidate once they walked into the
voting booth. Using exit poll data, I also attempt to determine when voters finally
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decided how they would cast their ballot. There is the possibility that the
hypotheses presented for research will be disproved but that the research
question will be validated. For this to be true, the research would demonstrate
that there are, in fact, differences in the way undeclared voters act but that these
actions have little impact on the way they vote or on the outcome of the election.
In an effort to examine the actions of voters in different political climates,
as well as to allow the data to be timely and therefore useful for future candidates
and campaigns, the research presented below focuses solely on the 2000 and
2004 New Hampshire presidential primaries. President Bill Clinton was
completing his second term in office when the 2000 New Hampshire primary took
place. With no incumbent on the ballot, both major political parties featured fully
contested primaries with no clear front-runner. Additionally, both parties fielded
candidates who actively courted independent or undeclared voters. Many in the
press and political establishment viewed these voters as key to winning the
election, primarily because in the days leading up to the primary the race was still
too close to call.
The 2004 New Hampshire presidential primary occurred in a much
different political climate. Republican President George W. Bush sought reelection and faced no serious opposition within his own party. The Democratic
nomination, on the other hand, was highly contested, with several serious
contenders on the ballot in New Hampshire. The country was also debating
serious issues in 2004. September 11th significantly altered the political climate
and agenda in the ensuing years. President Bush initially saw a huge bump in
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political support but, as the country became involved in two ground wars, some
voiced their concerns about the direction the country was headed. Many
Republicans supported the president whole-heartedly, while many Democrats
were ready for new leadership.
As a result of the differing political climate in the two election years,
undeclared voters had the opportunity to pursue different voting strategies in
each election. Since both party primaries were heavily contested in 2000, one
might assume that undeclared voters who leaned toward supporting one party
over the other would vote for a candidate in the party they support, rather than
risk wasting their vote. The primary in 2004, however offered undeclared voters
a broader set of strategic alternatives. A vote by an undeclared voter in the
Republican primary might be considered a waste as there was no real likelihood
that President Bush would lose the primary. Many pundits and political scholars
wondered if undeclared voters who leaned toward the Republican Party would
spoil their vote in 2004 to negatively impact the Democratic Party. If this were
the case, one could assume that more undeclared voters would vote in the
Democratic primary than the Republican primary and may cast ballots for a
weaker candidate in the hopes of helping the president in the general election.
In order to answer these research questions, I analyzed pre-primary
tracking polls conducted by the University of New Hampshire Survey Center in
conjunction with various media outlets in both 2000 and 2004, as well as Election
Day exit polls conducted by the Voter News Service and National Election Pool
respectively. I scrutinized these polls to determine differences in political interest
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and actions prior to the primary, whether voters as a group wavered in their
choice of candidate, when voters decided for whom to vote, and how they finally
cast their ballots. I also examined Election Day checklists and ballot records to
analyze differences in voter turnout between registered partisans and undeclared
voters. The results of this research may provide a guide for future candidates as
to the most effective way of campaigning for the votes of this critical bloc.
Before beginning an analysis of voter actions in the 2000 and 2004 New
Hampshire primaries, it is necessary to provide some clarification on the data.
With any analysis of the New Hampshire primary and independent voters, one
must look at two subsets of the electorate: those who consider themselves to be
independent regardless of their voter registration and those who are registered
undeclared. Journalists often assume that voters who are registered as
undeclared to be “independent.” This research attempts to understand whether
undeclared is synonymous with independent when describing New Hampshire
voters.
In the pre-primary tracking polls, the UNH Survey Center, asked voters
about both their voter registration and self-selected party identification. The party
identification scale employed by the Survey Center is the University of Michigan
scale referred to earlier wherein respondents identify themselves as a strong
Democrat, weak Democrat, independent favoring the Democratic Party,
independent, independent favoring the Republican Party, weak Republican, or
strong Republican. Prior research on independent voters often found that
leaning independents act more like registered partisans than those who consider

38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

themselves strictly independent. Further, leaning independents often act more
like strong partisans than do weak partisans (Keith et al 1992, Fowler, Spiliotes,
and Vavreck 2003). Does this prior research apply to New Hampshire? Where
possible this thesis will seek to evaluate such differences.

Do New Hampshire undeclared voters act like registered partisans?
As noted above, there are two ways to analyze voter actions. One is to
investigate the way voters act prior to Election Day by analyzing their interest in
the election, whether they intend to vote, if they follow the candidate debates, or
make an effort to see or meet candidates. The other is to observe who votes on
Election Day and for which candidate. Campbell, Nie, and Patterson all find
major differences in the way that independent voters act when compared to
partisan voters. Keith, on the other hand, makes a distinction between pure
independents and those who lean toward supporting a particular party. Fowler’s
research in 2002 shows that New Hampshire’s undeclared voters act very much
like registered partisans. In New Hampshire’s recent primaries, which research
regarding the actions of undeclared voters is more applicable: that of Campbell,
Nie and Patterson or that of Keith and Fowler et al?

Pre-primary Interest and Actions
In order to evaluate voter actions prior to Election Day, pre-primary
tracking polls conducted by the University of New Hampshire Survey Center in
both 2000 and 2004, as well as exit polls conducted by the Voter News Service
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in 2000, were analyzed. The UNH Survey Center tracking polls asked likely
voters how interested they were in the primary and how likely they were to vote.3
In both election years, responses were tabulated both by party identification and
voter registration. This type of survey research allows for easy comparisons
between those who consider themselves independent and those who are
registered as undeclared. The 2000 Voter News Service exit polls evaluated
voter actions related to candidate debates and personal contact with primary
candidates. These exit poll questions were only evaluated by voter registration.
Based on data from the UNH Survey Center pre-primary tracking polls, in
both 2000 and 2004, registered partisans were slightly more likely than
undeclared voters to say they were “very interested” or “extremely interested” in
the primary election. In 2000, 76 percent of registered Democrats, 78 percent of
registered Republicans, and 70 percent of those registered as undeclared
answered in this manner. In 2004, 86 percent of registered Democrats and 80
percent of undeclared voters said they were either very or extremely interested in
the primary.
When tallied by party identification, leaning independents in both election
years were as or more likely than weak partisans to be very or extremely
interested in the primary. In 2000, Republican-leaning independents were third
only to strong Democrats and strong Republicans in likelihood of responding that
they were very or extremely interested in the primary. Perhaps surprisingly, non-

3 In 2004, the U N H Survey Center only polled voters who were likely to vote in the Democratic primary as
it was the only contested race.
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Table 3.1

Extremely interested
Very interested
Somewhat interested
Not very interested

2000 New Hampshire Primary - Interest by Party Identification
Dem Leaning Non-leaning
Rep Leaning
Strong Dem
Weak Dem
Independent
independent
Independent
36%
18%
23%
27%
27%
44%
48%
44%
44%
50%
19%
29%
28%
25%
21%
1%
4%
4%
4%
3%
n=422

n=245

n=341

n=300

n=318

Weak Rep
22%
49%
25%
4%

Strong Rep
39%
43%
15%
3%

n=313

n=503

n=2466
Chi Square = 91.269, Asymp. Sig. = 0.000
df = 28
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

Table 3.2
2004 New Hampshire Primary - Interest by Party Identification
Dem Leaning
Non-leaning
Strong Dem
Weak Dem
Independent
independent
Extremely interested
43%
27%
33%
28%
Very interested
47%
44%
47%
47%
Somewhat interested
10%
25%
18%
21%
Not very interested
0%
3%
2%
4%
n=449

n=135

n=323

N = 1093
Chi Square = 62.795, Asymp. Sig = 0.000
df = 21
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004

n=186

leaning independents were more likely than either weak Democrats or
Democratic-leaning independents to say the same. In 2004, both Democraticleaning independents and non-leaning independents were more likely than weak
Democrats to be very or extremely interested in the primary.
Similar trends are noted when potential voters were asked to define how
likely they were to vote on primary day. Voters were given six response choices,
however, only respondents answering that they may vote, will vote unless
emergency, will definitely vote continued with the survey. As seen in the survey
question related to interest in the primary, registered partisans were more likely
than undeclared voters to say that they would definitely vote. In 2000, 69 percent
of registered Democrats, 75 percent of registered Republicans, and 65 percent of
those registered as undeclared said that they would definitely vote in the primary.
In 2004, 75 percent of registered Democrats and 63 percent of undeclared voters
made the same statement.
When evaluating responses by party identification, surprising results were
obtained. In the 2000 primary, non-leaning independents were more likely to say
they would definitely vote than were weak partisans or leaning independents on
either side of the political spectrum. Additionally, leaning independents and weak
partisans were equally likely to say they would definitely vote. In 2004,
Democratic-leaning independents were more likely than non-leaning
independents or weak Democrats to say they would definitely vote. As will be
discussed later, the high interest among independent voters in 2000 may
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Table 3.3

May Vote in election
Will vote unless emergency
Definitely vote

2000 New Hampshire Primary - Likely to vote by Party Identification
Rep Leaning
Non-leaning
Dem Leaning
Strong
Independent
independent
Weak Dem Independent
Dem
8%
9%
.
14%
12%
8%
22%
25%
26%
29%
18%
69%
68%
60%
59%
74%
n=423

n=318

n=299

n=340

N=246

Weak Rep
10%
24%
67%

Strong
Rep
5%
14%
81%

n=314

n=502

n=2466
Chi Square = 71.815, Asymp. Sig = 0.000
df = 14
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

^

Table 3.4

u>

2004 New Hampshire Primary - Likely to vote by Party Identification
Strong
Dem Leaning
Non-leaning
Dem
Weak Dem Independent
independent
May Vote in election
5%
12%
6%
15%
Will vote unless emergency
17%
33%
29%
26%
Definitely vote
78%
55%
64%
59%
n=449

n=134

n=323

n = 1090
Chi Square = 55.275, Asymp. Sig = 0.00
df = 14
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 2 5 ,2 0 0 4

N=184

be due to the popularity of centrist candidates who actively campaigned for the
undeclared voting block.
In a state where political participation is generally higher than national
averages, an examination of political participation outside of voting is also
relevant. Exit polls from the 2000 New Hampshire primary asked respondents
how closely they followed the party debates, how many candidates they had
seen in person, and what campaign medium affected their vote choice the most
(Voter News Service 2000). Unfortunately, polls conducted after the 2004
Democratic primary did not ask similar questions. It is still useful to examine the
responses to the poll questions from 2000 to try to understand how undeclared
voters respond to the campaign cycle.
Voters who voted in the 2000 Democratic primary were very likely to have
followed the party debates “somewhat” or “very closely.” Seventy-nine percent of
registered Democrats who cast ballots in the primary said that they followed the
debates very or somewhat closely, while 75 percent of undeclared voters said
the same. In the Republican primary, voter behavior was actually reversed with
82 percent of registered Republicans and 85 percent of undeclared voters
following the debates somewhat or very closely.
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Table 3.5
2000 Followed Primary Debates - By Voter Registration

Very closely
Somewhat closely
Not too closely
Not closely at all

Republican
35%
47%
15%
3%

Undeclared
in R Primary
34%
51%
14%
2%

Undeclared
in D Primary
27%
48%
16%
9%

Democrat
32%
47%
17%
4%

n=632

n=322

n=242

n= 472

Chi Square = 11.613

Chi Square = 9.192

Asymp. Sig . = 0.071

Asymp. Sig. =: 0.163

df = 6

df = 6

Source: Voter News Service, New Hampshire Primary Exit Polls, 2000.

One area of political participation where registered partisans responded in
a clearly different manner from undeclared voters was in the likelihood of having
seen a candidate in person prior to the election. Polls of voters who cast ballots
in the 2000 Democratic primary showed that 32 percent of registered Democrats
had seen at least one of the two major candidates while only 20 percent of
undeclared voters could say the same. In the 2000 Republican primary, 44
percent of registered Republicans had seen at least one candidate while only 35
percent of undeclared voters had seen any of the candidates in person. These
results coupled with the responses related to interest in the debates are not
surprising given the assumed lack of party loyalty by undeclared voters. If
undeclared voters are unsure of the primary in which they will vote, they may be
less likely to seek out a specific candidate to meet. Additionally, one could
speculate that they might also seek more information, in the form of debates, to
help them make their decision. As none of the referenced polls sought to
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understand why voters acted in a particular matter, these are statements of
supposition rather than fact and provide opportunity for future study.
In summary, while there are differences in voter interest and actions
among partisan and undeclared voters act prior to voting, the differences are not
as great as one might expect. In at least one instance (interest in the debates),
there was virtually no difference in the involvement of voters. When voter
responses regarding interest in the primary and likelihood of voting were tallied
by party identification rather than voter registration, the results were revealing.
Leaning independents tended to be at least as politically active as weak
partisans. In one case (interest in the primary), non-leaning independents were
more interested than weak partisan or leaning independents. The real question
is whether or not these actions by voters have any impact on the outcome of an
election. One way to relate actions to the outcome of an election is to analyze
voter turnout since it has a very direct impact on the results. As stated above,
prior research on the subject shows that independent voters are generally less
likely to vote than are partisans. Is the same true in New Hampshire where the
primary is open to undeclared voters and the presidential primaries are
considered major events?

Voter Turnout in the 2000 and 2004 New Hampshire Primaries
As discussed in the previous chapters, national voter turnout among
independent voters is generally lower than that of party loyalists, especially in
primary elections. Some states bar independent or undeclared voters from
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participating in party primaries if they are not previously registered as a member
of that party. Additionally, independent voters are often seen as more apathetic
about politics in general and therefore less likely to vote.
Overall turnout in the New Hampshire primary is usually higher than the
national average, due at least in part to the prominence of the election itself.
Additionally, New Hampshire’s open primary system, allowing undeclared voters
to change party affiliation to one of the major parties on the day of the primary,
encourages higher voter participation. Undeclared voters are not only allowed to
participate in the party primaries, these open rules let them to vote in a
meaningful election, even if only one party primary is contested.

Turnout in the 2000 Primary. On Tuesday, February 1, 2000, a record
number of New Hampshire voters turned out to vote in the presidential primary.
“Good weather and hard-fought races produced a record number of votes for a
New Hampshire presidential primary” (Tirrell-Wysocki 3 Feb 2000). A total of
396,385 of 783,852 registered voters cast ballots in the February primary, a 51%
turnout. Of the 396,385 primary voters, more than 38,000 of those registered to
vote at the polls (State of New Hampshire 2001 181). The total voter turnout in
2000 exceeded the previous record of 358,303 (set in 1992) by more than 10
percent (Tirrell-Wysocki 3 Feb 2000). Prior to Election Day, Secretary of State
William Gardner anticipated undeclared voters would account for approximately
23 percent of the total votes cast (Tirrell-Wysocki 3 Feb 2000). When all the
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ballots were tallied, 111,013 undeclared voters participated in the election,
accounting for 28 percent of the total vote (State of New Hampshire 2001 181).
Voter turnout rates in the 2000 primary were higher for registered
partisans than for undeclared voters. Republicans led the way with 60 percent
turnout, followed by the Democrats at 54 percent, and undeclared voters at 39
percent.
Table 3.6
Voter Turnout 2000 New Hampshire Primary
Republican Turnout 2000 Presidential Primary
Total Republican Ballots Cast (incl absentee)
Total Undeclared Voting in Rep Primary
Total Registered Republican Turnout
Total Republicans on Voter Checklist
Turnout Percentage

239,523
68,492
171,031
286,244
60%

Democrat Turnout 2000 Presidential Primary
Total Democrat Ballots Cast (incl absentee)
Total Undeclared Voting in Dem Primary
Total Registered Democrat Turnout
Total Democrats on Voter Checklist
Turnout Percentage

156,862
42,521
114,341
211,708
54%

Undeclared Turnout 2000 Presidential Primary
Total Undeclared Voting in Rep Primary
Total Undeclared Voting in Dem Primary
Total Undeclared Voter Turnout
Total Undeclared on Voter Checklist
Turnout Percentage

68,492
42,521
111,013
285,642
39%

Source: New Hampshire Manual for the General Court, 2 0 0 1,1 8 1 .

Taking advantage of New Hampshire’s voting laws, 70 percent of undeclared
voters who voted in a party primary in 2000, returned to undeclared status prior
to leaving the polling station.
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If one were to assume that undeclared voters are really closet partisans
rather than independent, one might also assume that undeclared voters would
split their vote similarly to the breakdown of registered partisans. In 2000,
however, the percentage of undeclared voters voting in the Republican Party
exceeded the percentage of registered partisans who were registered to vote in
the Republican Party.
Figure 3.1

Party Breakdown of Registered Partisans in 2000
New Hampshire Presidential Primary
0 Percent

Registered
Republican

43% i

57%

■ Percent
Registered
Democrat

n=497,952

Figure 3.2

Percent of Undeclared Voters Casting Ballots in
Each Party Primary 2000
a Percent
Undeclared
Voting in
Republican
Primary
■ Percent
Undeclared
Voting in
Democratic
Primary

Source: N ew Hampshire Manual for the General Court, No 57, 2001, p 181.
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Was this the result of more Republicans than Democrats choosing to register as
undeclared than or was there something about the Republican or Democratic
candidates that pushed undeclared voters to the Republican primary in greater
numbers?

The 2004 Primary. On Tuesday, January 27, 2004, a record number of
voters turned out to vote in the Democratic primary. “More than 208,000 people
voted in New Hampshire, easily topping the 170,000 who turned out in 1992.
That year, like [2004], there was a crowded Democratic field and no dominant
front-runner in the early contests” (Stone and Page 29 Jan 2004). The large
turnout was credited to the presence of two local candidates (Senator John Kerry
from Massachusetts and Howard Dean of Vermont) and a close race, with
Senator Kerry surpassing Dean in the final days of the campaign.
While overall voter turnout in 2004 was less than that in 2000 (41 percent
versus 51 percent), Democratic turnout was nine percent higher. Only 54
percent of registered Democrats voted in 2000 while 63 percent cast ballots in
2004. The downswing in overall voter turnout was due entirely to the poor
Republican showing with only 25 percent of registered Republicans casting
ballots (State of New Hampshire 2005 169) in a primary in which President Bush
saw only token opposition on the ballot.
Somewhat surprisingly, undeclared voter turnout in 2004 remained almost
unchanged from 2000. Thirty-eight percent of undeclared voters voted in 2004
compared to 39 percent in 2000. Because it was the only seriously contested
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one, nearly all undeclared voters chose to vote in the Democratic primary (93
percent) rather than the Republican primary (7 percent).
Table 3.7
Voter Turnout 2004 New Hampshire Primary
Republican Turnout 2004 Presidential Primary
69,414
7,702

Total Republican Ballots Cast (incl absentee)
Total Undeclared Voting in Rep Primary
Total Registered Republican Turnout
Total Republicans on Voter Checklist
Turnout Percentage

246,529
25%

Democrat Turnout 2004 Presidential Primary
Total Democrat Ballots Cast (incl absentee)
Total Undeclared Voting in Dem Primary
Total Registered Democrat Turnout
Total Democrats on Voter Checklist
Turnout Percentage

221,309
95,634
125,675
199,386
63%

61,712

Undeclared Turnout 2004 Presidential Primary
Total Undeclared Voting in Rep Primary
Total Undeclared Voting in Dem Primary
Total Undeclared Voter Turnout

7,702
95,634
103,336

Total Undeclared on Voter Checklist
Turnout Percentage

270,052
38%

Source: New Hampshire Manual for the General Court, 2005,169.

Seventy-eight percent of the undeclared voters who voted changed their
registration back to undeclared prior to leaving the polling station (State of New
Hampshire 2005 169).
Total voter turnout for undeclared voters in each of these two primaries
was remarkably consistent, despite the fact that the elections themselves were
so different. The difference between the two primaries derived from where
undeclared voters chose to cast their ballots. In 2000, 62 percent of the votes
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cast by undeclared voters were cast in the Republican primary. In 2004, 93
percent of the ballots cast by undeclared voters were recorded in the Democratic
primary. In 2000, it is likely that undeclared voters voted in the Republican
primary due to Senator John McCain’s appeal among undeclared voters. Pre
primary tracking polls and exit polls in 2000 showed that McCain appealed to
both registered undeclared voters and those who view themselves as
independent, regardless of which party they leaned towards (UNH Survey Center
2000). Senator John McCain actively campaigned for both independent and
undeclared voters. In 2000, undeclared voters flocked to a candidate, rather
than a party, with many undeclared voters telling reporters that they liked
McCain’s anti-establishment message. Alternately, in 2004, undeclared voters
cast their ballot where their vote counted. The Republican nomination was
virtually uncontested. President Bush was assured of a win, and voting in the
Republican primary would have no impact on the outcome of the election.
Whether or not some of the undeclared voters who voted in the 2004 Democratic
primary strategically voted for the weaker candidate will be addressed later in this
thesis.
Undeclared voters in the 2000 and 2004 New Hampshire presidential
primaries acted similarly to registered partisans but with some distinct
differences. As previous research suggested, independent/undeclared voters
were less likely to be extremely interested in the elections, less likely to say they
would definitely vote, and much less likely to have seen a candidate in person.
Undeclared voters in New Hampshire also turned out in much lower numbers
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than did registered partisans. However, these numbers alone don’t tell the whole
story. The differences in undeclared and partisan voters who were interested in
the primaries and in the party debates were minor, with most falling within the
error rate. Additionally, although the turnout among undeclared voters was
significantly less than either Democrats or Republicans in both 2000 and 2004,
undeclared voters played a deciding role in all three primaries.
We can also now see that undeclared voters are not necessarily
independent and vice versa. While results tend to be similar for voters who
consider themselves independent versus those who are actually registered
undeclared, evaluating results by party identification gives us additional insight
into the New Hampshire voter. In keeping with the findings of Keith et al, New
Hampshire’s leaning independent voters tend to act more like strong partisans
than weak partisans. Even more telling, in at least one case (2000 interest in the
primary) non-leaning partisans showed just as much or more interest in the
election than either leaning independents or weak partisans. Not only can one
ignore the differences in political involvement and actions of leaning and non
leaning independents, it appears that in New Hampshire, independent does not
mean apathetic.

Voter Volatility

There has long been debate in the political science community about
whether independent or undeclared voters are more volatile than partisans.
Flanigan and Zingale concluded that independent voters are indeed more volatile
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than registered partisans (68-74). Keith found that true independents are more
volatile than partisans but leaning independents are in fact more stable than are
weak partisans (65). In New Hampshire, Fowler’s research indicated that it is the
primaries themselves that are volatile, not necessarily the voters. Analyzing
voter reaction to campaign stimuli, Fowler’s research suggested that undeclared
voters are no more volatile than partisans (162).
The largest potential impact of independent or undeclared voters is their
ability to swing elections. If these voters are indeed volatile it will remain difficult
for political scientists, pollsters, the media, and even campaigns to understand
motivations of undeclared voters and capture their votes. As a result, it is
necessary to try to define how volatile these voters are. The second key
hypothesis tested in this research addresses this issue. The hypothesis states
that in the New Hampshire primary undeclared voters are more volatile than
registered voters, often deciding who to vote for at the last minute.
There are several ways to analyze volatility. One way is to look at the
whole group of independent/undeclared voters and see if this subset of the
electorate swings back and forth between candidates. Another way to analyze
volatility is to poll voters on how certain they are that they will support their
candidate on Election Day. Finally, exit polls can try to ascertain when voters
finally decided to vote for the candidate they chose.
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2000 Candidate Support
In the days and weeks leading up to the 2000 New Hampshire primary,
the press continually emphasized the role undeclared voters were expected to
play. However, some candidates played down the role of undeclared voters,
pointing out that independent or undeclared voters generally turn out in lower
numbers than party faithful and were therefore less important than the key
constituencies. Senator John McCain, who actively courted these voters, was
quoted as saying “They wouldn’t be independent if they were real likely voters, so
the percentage of their turnout will be much lower” (Kranish A30).4
On the whole, prior to the election, undeclared voters supported
Republican Senator John McCain as their choice for the nominee over all other
candidates in the field (Republican or Democrat). The same was also true of
voters who considered themselves independent (leaning or otherwise). This
became increasingly evident closer to election as McCain gained nearly 40
percent of both the undeclared vote and the independent vote, regardless of
which primary the undeclared voter intended on voting in.5

4 Candidates and the media often use the terms independent and undeclared synonym ously however, as w e
w ill see in this research, undeclared and independent voters are two distinct subsets o f the voting
population.
5 D aily samples o f voter preference are inherently volatile. The UNH Survey Center uses rolling samples
to smooth the daily volatility. The data presented here is not presented in rolling sample format and w ill
vary from the results presented by the Survey Center.
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Figure 3.3

2000 Leading Candidate among
Registered Undeclared Voters by Day
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Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

Figure 3.4

2000 Leading Candidate among
all Independent Voters by Day
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Democratic Senator Bill Bradley also enjoyed a share of the undeclared and
independent vote, although in both cases, as McCain gained support, it appears
he took voters from Bradley rather than from other Republican candidates.
The UNH Survey Center6 tracking polls in 2000 showed that voters who
identified themselves as independent (in any of the three sub categories) and
planned to vote in the 2000 Republican presidential primary were very consistent
in their support of Senator John McCain for president. These voters favored
John McCain over every other candidate in the field, every day of the 12-day
tracking poll. George W. Bush and Steve Forbes each had some traction with
independent voters but only managed to average about twenty percent of the
independent vote on any given day.
Figure 3.5

2000 Leading Republican Candidate among
independent Voters by Day
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Figure 3.6

2000 Leading Republican Candidate among
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Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

This level of support was evident on Election Day when undeclared voters voted
overwhelmingly for Arizona Senator John McCain, bringing him to victory in the
primary. The Los Angeles Times exit poll showed that 61 percent of self
described independent voters who cast ballots in the Republican primary voted
for McCain (Los Angeles Times 2000). Exit polls conducted by the Voter News
Service also showed McCain garnering a large percentage of the votes cast by
those registered as undeclared, putting him just shy of 62 percent (Voter News
Service 2000). McCain actively recruited independent and undeclared voters in
his New Hampshire campaign and the support of these voting blocs clearly paid
off.
In comparison, voters who identified themselves as strong Republicans
overwhelmingly supported Texas Governor George W. Bush in the days leading
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up to the primary. Weak Republicans alternated their support between McCain
and Bush, giving the slight edge to Bush over the course of the whole poll.
Figure 3.7
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Figure 3.8

2000 Leading Candidate among
Weak Republicans by Day
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Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

Despite the trends seen in these pre-primary tracking polls which suggested that
Republicans supported Bush over other candidates, Senator John McCain ended
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up winning the race among Republicans as well as undeclared voters. The LA
Times exit poll referenced above found that self-described Republicans voted for
McCain over Bush by a margin of 40 percent to 38 percent. Overall, McCain
walked away with 48 percent of the total ballots cast in the Republican primary
compared to 30 percent for Bush (State of New Hampshire, 2001,181). This
may have been due to higher than expected voter turnout among undeclared
voters.
In the same UNH Survey Center polls, undeclared voters who planned on
voting in the Democratic primary were less consistent in their support, fluctuating
between the two main candidates, New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley and Vice
President Al Gore. Each averaged less than 50 percent of the support over the
entire 12 day poll. Bradley actively courted undeclared voters leading up to
Election Day but faced stiffer competition from McCain than Gore because
undeclared voters had the opportunity to vote in either primary.
Figure 3.9
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Figure 3.10

2000 Leading Democratic Candidate among
Democratic-leaning Independents by Day
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Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

In The LA Times exit poll conducted on Election Day Bradley won 52 percent of
the votes cast by undeclared voters in the Democratic primary, while Vice
President Al Gore only collected 40 percent of the undeclared vote (Los Angeles
Times 2000). The VNS exit poll showed Bradley commanding nearly 60 percent
of the total undeclared vote in the Democratic Party (Voter News Service 2000).
By comparison, strong Democrats overwhelmingly supported Vice
President Al Gore. Weak Democrats also supported Gore but not with the same
margin as strong Democrats.
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Figure 3.11
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Figure 3.12
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Overall, Vice President Gore won the 2000 New Hampshire primary with 49
percent of the Democratic vote. Senator Bradley received 45 percent of the vote
(State of New Hampshire, 2001 182).
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There was clearly something about McCain and Bradley that appealed to
voters who considered themselves independent or undeclared. It may have
been that these two candidates were not the party favorites. Some voters who
truly consider themselves to be independent of party ideology will not accept
party guidance as easily as those who consider themselves strong party
supporters. There may have also been something in their campaign or message
that appealed to these voters.

2004 Candidate Support
The political climate in 2004 was vastly different from that of 2000. Only
the Democratic Party held a contested primary in the New Hampshire primary.
Also unique for New Hampshire in 2004 was the fact that two of the leading
candidates were from neighboring states. Senator John Kerry, hailing from
nearby Massachusetts, had served his state as a career politician for many years
and was well-known throughout the state and region. Howard Dean, a former
governor of neighboring Vermont, appealed to New Hampshire voters as one of
their own, a down-to-earth outsider. These two candidates showed significant
traction in early polls, perhaps as much through name recognition as anything
else.
In 2004, many of the Democratic candidates looked at the 2000 primary
and tried to capture the independent/undeclared electorate in the same way that
Senator John McCain did. Since it seemed likely that most undeclared voters
would cast their ballots in an election that mattered, the Democrats saw this
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group as key to winning, hoping to pull as many undeclared voters as possible
into the Democratic primary as votes for their candidate.
Senator Joe Lieberman targeted undeclared voters most aggressively with
direct mail, telephone campaigns, and constant comparisons to Senator John
McCain. “The 2000 Democratic vice presidential nominee is the only candidate
who is overtly going after McCain voters...” (Marelius A-1). His literature claimed
that many McCain supporters had endorsed his campaign and cast Lieberman
as an “independent leader” (Joe Lieberman for President, 2004). The Christian
Science Monitor stated, “Joe Lieberman is, perhaps, making the most unabashed
pitch to McCain independents...he counts his similarities to McCain among his
greatest strengths, contending regularly, ‘I’m the closest to John McCain you can
get.’” (Marks 2004). Lieberman’s campaign for McCain voters showed how
eager Democrats were to capture this voting bloc in 2004. After all, John McCain
was a Republican candidate in 2000.
Howard Dean and General Wesley Clark also actively recruited
undeclared voters. Though many considered Dean to be left-of-center, his antiestablishment message and outsider perspective targeted independents. “Clark,
who [billed] himself on the stump as ‘a leader, not a politician,’ and who just
joined the Democratic Party last year” cast himself as a candidate who cared
more about the issues than politics (Finer A10). All the Democratic candidates
in the 2004 race believed it was necessary to acknowledge the undeclared voting
bloc, if not court them outright.
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Pollsters and the press seemed frustrated by the non-committal nature of
the New Hampshire voter in 2004. As seen earlier, the trends of support in 2000
were easy to spot. Different subsets of the electorate lined up solidly behind
specific candidates. The same was not true in 2004.
Maybe the Granite State should change its nickname to the Non
committal State. Most of the major Democratic candidates for president
have been campaigning here for more than a year; political ads have
been on television since August. Yet 11 days before the primary
Monday [sic], many New Hampshire voters can’t make up their minds
(Kiely 5A).
But were undeclared voters more volatile than registered Democrats in 2004?
Was it the independent nature of New Hampshire voters or the political climate
that made voters less sure of their vote?
For the majority of the 10-day tracking poll conducted by the UNH Survey
Center7, John Kerry was the leading candidate both among voters who were
registered as undeclared and who classified themselves as independent.8 The
only exception was the first 4 days of the tracking poll, where Howard Dean led
by a significant margin. On the first day of the poll, 63 percent of those
interviewed by the UNH Survey Center supported Dean, while only 13 percent
planned to vote for Kerry.

7 The 2004 U N H Survey Center tracking polls were sponsored by W MUR, Fox N ew s, and WCVB.
8 The U N H Survey Center only polled voters who were likely to vote in the Democratic primary as it was
the only contested race in 2004.
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Figure 3.13
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Figure 3.14
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Figure 3.15

2004 Leading Democratic Candidate among
Democratic-leaning Independents by Day
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Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004

Dean’s declining support is attributed to his less-than-stellar performance in the
Iowa Caucus. The caucus was held on January 19th, 10 days before the New
Hampshire primary. John Kerry won Iowa by a significant margin. Perhaps more
importantly, following his defeat in Iowa, Howard Dean found out that not all
press is good press. His infamous “Dean Scream” resonated over and over
again on the national and New Hampshire news. Dean also decided to return to
Vermont to regroup after his unexpected finish in Iowa, rather than go on the
offensive in New Hampshire, a decision that may have cost him public support
among New Hampshire voters (Porteus 22 January 2004). Kerry gained a huge
momentum swing with his win and Dean’s negative media attention. This is
evident in the polling numbers in New Hampshire.
Unlike Senator McCain’s success with undeclared voters in 2000, Senator
Joe Lieberman never gained any real traction in New Hampshire, despite the fact
that he was the one candidate who most aggressively targeted these voters. The
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highest Senator Lieberman ever rose in the polls was 18 percent, while Kerry
averaged 26 percent. This indicates that targeting undeclared^ voters isn’t the
only key to winning their support. Candidates must give voters other reasons to
vote for them such as electability, their stand on issues, or their personality,
among other things.
Among partisans, self-described strong Democrats were much more
consistent in their support of Kerry prior to the primary. Kerry, the party favorite,
led all other candidates in nine of the 10 survey days (on January 23rd, Kerry
dipped below Dean temporarily). Among weak Democrats however, support
fluctuated between candidates. The leading candidate among weak Democrats
changed almost daily.
Figure 3.16
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Figure 3.17

2004 Leading Candidate among Weak Democrats
by Day
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Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004

These polling numbers suggest more about the political climate in 2004
than the psyche of the undeclared voter. Surprisingly, those who defined
themselves as independent seemed more inclined to follow the party line or at
least support the candidate they felt had the best chance in November than to
stake out their own territory. The volatility of weak Democrats may also point to
the lack of a truly strong candidate.
On Primary Day, New Hampshire Democrats turned out in record
numbers and nearly as many undeclared voters cast ballots as did in 2000. As
the pre-primary tracking polls predicted, John Kerry ended up running away with
the primary. “Kerry’s margin [of victory] among independents [undeclared], who
turned out in record proportions, was only slightly less than among Democrats,
the surveys showed.... With surveys showing electability against President Bush
in November a major factor in voters’ minds, late-deciding voters swung to Kerry”
(Mooney 19 January 2004).
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Even though 93% of undeclared voters voted in the Democratic primary,
there did not appear to be much vote spoiling. Votes by undeclared voters went
to the same candidates as those cast by registered Democrats. Although there
were surely votes cast intentionally for weaker candidates, these votes did not
have an impact on the election. The National Election Pool exit polls showed
that John Kerry captured 38 percent of the votes cast by undeclared voters.
Howard Dean placed second among undeclared voters capturing 25 percent of
the vote. John Edwards and Wesley Clark garnered 14 and 12 percent of the
undeclared vote respectively (Edison Media Research 2004). In the end, John
Kerry won the New Hampshire primary with 38 percent of the vote. Howard
Dean finished a distant second with 26 percent of the vote (State of New
Hampshire, 2005 170).

Certainty of Support
Tracking the leading candidate among a subset of the electorate only
provides an understanding of how the group as a whole intends to vote and
whether different candidates are able to capture the minds of voters at different
points prior to the election. In addition to tracking the leading candidate on any
given day, pollsters also try to ascertain how certain individual voters are that
they will support their candidate of choice when Election Day finally comes. As
they get more information about the candidates, most voters become more
certain of their choice closer to Election Day. The assumption in previous

70

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

research is that undeclared or independent voters tend to be less certain of their
choice than are registered partisans.
In both 2000 and 2004, pre-primary tracking polls conducted by the
University of New Hampshire Survey Center and sponsored by network affiliates,
asked voters this very question. The question posed to survey respondents was
the same in both years: “Are you certain to support that person, or do you think
you may change your mind and support someone else in th e

(year)

primary?” (UNH Survey Center, 2000 and 2004 Pre-Primary tracking polls). The
response choices were: certain to support, may change mind, or don’t know. I
cross-tabulated responses by voter registration and self-described party
identification.
When analyzed by a respondent’s party identification, the responses fell in
line with prior research on independent voters. Those who considered
themselves partisan were, on the whole, more certain of their vote choice than
those who considered themselves independent. However, independent voters
were more confident in their choice than were weak partisans.
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Figure 3.189
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Figure 3.19
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In the 2000 New Hampshire presidential primary, strong partisans were, on
average, confident in their vote choice 77 percent of the time, compared with 60
percent for weak partisans. Independent voters averaged 63 percent confidence.

1Supporting data including Chi-Square calculations for figures 3.18-3.23 can be found in Appendix B.
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In 2004, the results were similar. Strong Democrats were confident in their vote
choice 64 percent of the time, compared with 45 percent for weak partisans.
Independent voters averaged 55 percent confidence. The difference in election
year results is not surprising given the strength of candidates in each year.
When analyzing independent voters more closely, differentiating between
those who consider themselves true independents versus those who lean toward
supporting one party over the other, one would expect leaning independents to
be less volatile than pure independents. In 2000, this was not the case. Leaning
independents were certain of their vote choice an average of 63 percent of the
time, while straight independents were certain 64 percent of the time. However,
both types of independent voters were more confident in their choice than were
weak partisans. Weak partisans averaged a confidence of 60 percent. This level
of certainty among independent voters may have been due to the strength of
John McCain’s candidacy among independents. In 2004, independents were
less certain on the whole and there was a greater differentiation between leaning
and non-leaning independents. Leaners were confident of their vote selection 56
percent of the time while non-leaners were confident only 51 percent of the time.
As in 2000, both subsets of independent voters were more confident in their
choice than were weak Democrats. Weak Democrats averaged 45 percent
certainty.
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Figure 3.20
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Figure 3.21
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When cross-tabulating the survey results based on voter registration
rather than party identification, one sees the same trends are visible. Undeclared
voters were, on the whole, less confident of their vote choice than were
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registered partisans in both election years. In both election years, the difference
in averages of those who were certain of their vote choice was approximately 5
percent. As with the results above, overall, voters were more confident of their
vote choice in 2000 than they were in 2004, and grew more certain the closer it
came to Election Day.

Figure 3.22

Percent Certain of Vote Choice by Registration
2000
©
o

85% -1
80% -

Registered
Partisans
* - Registered
Undeclared

c o ' u /0 '
ra x: 65% 'g ° 60% O
55% -

Date
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000

75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 3.23
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Time of Decision
The final analysis of voter volatility is based on exit poll data regarding
when voters finally chose which candidate they would support in the primary. All
of the exit polls conducted by The Los Angeles Times, the Voter News Service
and the National Election Pool in both 2000 and 2004, asked similar questions
regarding the timing of candidate selection by voters. In both election years, late
decision-making by voters led to results that differed from what pollsters and
political analysts had anticipated. In all cases, a larger percentage of undeclared
voters than registered partisans made up their minds at the last minute. The
difference between partisans and undeclared/independent voters ranged from as
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little as six percent to as much as 19 percent. There was very little difference in
the results when one compares voter registration to party identification.10
In 2000, undeclared voters who voted in the Democratic Party were the
least sure of their decision leading up to the election with 58 percent of these
voters deciding who to vote for within the last week of the campaign. Eighteen
percent of those same voters made their final decision on Election Day. In
comparison, only 39 percent of registered Democrats decided within the last
week, and only 12 percent left their decision to Primary Day.
Table 3.8
2000 Voter News Service Exit Poll - Democratic Primary
Question: When did you finally decide who to vote for?

Today
Within Last 3 days
Within Last week
This year
Before that

Voter Registration
Democrat Undeclared
12%
18%
17%
8%
19%
23%
40%
25%
20%
16%

Party ID
Democrat Independent
17%
13%
9%
15%
18%
26%
39%
28%
14%
20%

Source: 2000 Voter New Service Presidential Primary Exit Polls 2000

In the Republican primary, undeclared/independent were more likely to make up
their minds at the last minute, but the difference was not nearly as great. In the
2000 primary, 52 percent of undeclared voters decided within the last week,
while 46 percent of Republicans did the same.

10 The exit polls conducted b y the Voter N ew s Service and the National Election Pool only used the 3 point
scale to determine a respondent’s party identification. Unfortunately, it is therefore im possible to
distinguish between those w ho lean toward supporting one party m ost o f the time but still consider
themselves to be independent.

77

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 3.9
2000 Voter News Service Exit Poll - Republican Primary
Question: When did you finally decide who to vote for?

Today
Within Last 3 days
Within Last week
This year
Before that

Registration
Republican Undeclared
13%
16%
11%
14%
22%
23%
39%
36%
14%
11%

Party ID
Republican Independent
14%
15%
12%
13%
20%
27%
39%
34%
14%
10%

Source: Voter New Service Presidential Primary Exit Polls 2000

Similar percentages of Republican and undeclared voters waited until Election
Day to finally make up their minds.
In the 2004 Democratic primary, 10 percent more undeclared voters (60
percent) than registered Democrats (50 percent) decided who to vote for within
the last week of the campaign.
Table 3.10
2004 National Election Pool Exit Poll - Democratic Primary
Question: When did you finally decide whom to vote for in the presidential
primary?

Within Last 3 days
Within Last week
Last month
Before that

Voter Registration
Democrat Undeclared
32%
40%
19%
21%
17%
16%
31%
22%

Party ID
Democrat Independent
31%
40%
19%
20%
20%
19%
30%
21%

Source: Edison Media Research, Mitofsky International, and National Election Pool 2004

This late-decision making reflected the overall campaign decline of Howard Dean
who lost significant support following the Iowa Caucus. It is no wonder pollsters
had difficulty predicting the outcome with more than 30 percent of the electorate
deciding within the last 3 days of the campaign.
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Volatile or Indecisive?
Pre-primary tracking polls and Election Day exit polls in both 2000 and
2004 show that undeclared and independent voters are more volatile than strong
supporters of either party. Polls conducted prior to the primary show that when
asked how certain voters were of their vote choice, undeclared voters were less
sure than strong Republicans or Democrats. However, undeclared and
independent voters were more sure of their choice than were weak partisans.
Exit polls conducted after both the 2000 and 2004 primaries showed that
undeclared/independent voters were also more likely to make up their minds
about who to vote for in the week leading up to the election. The exit polls did
not split out strong and weak partisans so it is impossible to know if there is a
difference within the partisan voting block.
The most important political question is whether or not this volatility makes
any difference in the outcome of the election. In the end, voters voted for the
candidate the polls predicted they would. While individual voters may have had
doubts about which circle they would fill in, the group as a whole stayed true to
the candidates for whom they planned to vote (McCain and Bradley in 2000, and
Kerry in 2004). While neither campaigns nor the media should discount the
volatility of this voting bloc, they shouldn’t over-emphasize it either. Should a
dramatic event occur in the waning days of a New Hampshire campaign,
undeclared/independent voters might switch candidates. This was evident in the
Dean drop-off in 2004. However, without such an event, undeclared/independent
voters will likely support the candidate they have throughout the election cycle.
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This candidate is likely to be the one that has appealed to the non-partisan
nature of these undeclared voters, regardless of party.
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CONCLUSION

The New Hampshire primary is a unique political experience, in many
ways encompassing the ideal democratic process. Here voters require
candidates to get up close and personal with the electorate. Candidates don’t
need to spend the most money or employ a large campaign staff to get noticed.
What they must do is inspire the voters. The national trend of declining
partisanship bemoaned by many political scientists and analysts appears to be
as evident in New Hampshire as anywhere else. However, the increasing
number of voters choosing to register undeclared belies the reality that many
independent and undeclared voters act more partisan than weak partisans.
Additionally, while voters are not as likely to unconditionally support their party as
they once might have, most voters (75 percent) lean toward supporting one party
most of the time.
New Hampshire’s undeclared voters uphold many of the stereotypical
views of independent voters. As Campbell et al, Nie et al, and Patterson each
determined in their voting samples, New Hampshire’s undeclared and/or
independent voters are less likely to be extremely interested in the elections, less
likely to say they will definitely vote, much less likely to have seen a candidate in
person, and ultimately less likely to vote than their partisan counterparts.
However, while there are clearly differences between the motivations and actions
of partisan and undeclared voters, candidates should be careful not to over
emphasize these differences. In reality, these differences have little impact on
the outcome of the primary election. For the most part, undeclared voters in the
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New Hampshire primary act like registered partisans, choosing not to declare a
party affiliation.
For New Hampshire voters, there are definite benefits to registering as
undeclared. Undeclared voters have the ability to vote for a candidate who
appeals to their political senses regardless of party. In the case of John McCain
in the 2000 presidential primary, it appears that his independent message
resonated with voters whether they tended to lean left or right. Additionally,
registering as undeclared allows voters to always vote in a relevant election. In
2004, 93 percent of undeclared voters voted in the Democratic primary voting in
a very similar fashion to registered Democrats. The results would indicate that
very few voters crossed the hypothetical party lines to vote for the weaker
candidate.
New Hampshire’s undeclared and independent voters are more volatile
than registered partisans. In the days leading up to each primary election,
undeclared voters were more likely than partisans to say they were unsure about
whether they would actually vote for their candidate of choice. Exit polls showed
they decided later in each cycle. This could be due to the fact that there are
more choices open to undeclared voters (which primary to vote in and which
candidate to vote for) or it could be an unwillingness on the part of the voter to
reveal his true intentions to a pollster or reporter. Despite the apparent volatility
of this ever increasing block of the electorate, undeclared voters as a group
appear to stay true to the candidate favored over time. While individual voters
may change their minds day to day, the candidate who led among undeclared
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voters in pre-primary tracking polls was the candidate chosen on Election Day.
Although undeclared voters were individually less decisive, the group as a whole
consistently supported the same candidate in much the same way as registered
partisans. These findings coincide with those presented by Fowler, Spiliotes,
and Vavreck who concluded that it is primaries that are inherently volatile, not the
voters themselves (162).
While the prior research presented in this thesis can provide a basis for
understanding independent voters, one must be careful not to fully extend these
findings to New Hampshire’s undeclared voters. Additionally, as Keith et al and
Smith el al remind us, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between those
voters who are truly independent and those who consider themselves to be
independent but lean toward supporting one party the majority of the time.
Finally, the culture and prominence of the New Hampshire primary also impacts
how its voters act. Due in part to the intense media coverage, voters in the
Granite State tend to be more involved in primary politics than voters in other
states, leading to a minimalization of the differences often cited between partisan
and independent or undeclared voters.
The differences in partisan and undeclared and independents voters are
not what they appear. What is most important for serious presidential candidates
is to capture the attention of New Hampshire undeclared voters. While they may
vote in lower numbers than partisans, they still turn out in significant numbers
and can be a determining factor. In both primary years studied here, undeclared
voters represented a significant portion of the votes cast for the winning
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candidates. It is also clear that a candidate who speaks to the independent
tendencies of undeclared voters while at the same time capturing the core of
their party, has the potential to be a serious contender for the White House.
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APPENDIX A

VOTER REGISTRATION / PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY VOTERS

Table A.1
2000 Comparison Voter Registration/Party ID
7 point scale

Registered
Democrat
Undeclared
Registered
Republican
Will register at
polls

Indep

Ind
Closer
to Rep

Not
Strong
Rep

Strong
Rep

Other
Party

15%
27%

5%
27%

2%
22%

1%
7%

1%
5%

1%
1%

n=741

2%

2%

5%

13%

27%

49%

1%

n=923

12%

12%

12%

21%

3%

18%

6%

n=33

Strong
Dem

Not
Strong
Dem

Ind
Closer
to Dem

50%
5%

25%
6%

1%
15%

n = 2465
Chi Square = 2266.829,
Asymp. Sig = 0.000
df = 21
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

n=768
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Table A.2
2000 Comparison Party ID/Voter Registration
7 point scale

Strong Democrat
Not Strong Democrat
Ind Closer to Democrat
Independent
Ind Closer to
Republican
Not Strong Republican
Strong Republican

Registered
Democrat
88%
74%
34%
13%
6%
4%
1%

Undeclared
9%
19%
60%
71%

Registered
Republican
3%
6%
6%
16%

Will
Register at
polls
1%
2%
1%
1%

54%
17%
8%

39%
79%
89%

2%
0%
1%

n = 2465
Chi Square = 2266.829, Asymp. Sig = 0.000
df = 21
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

n=423
n=246
n=340
n=299
n=317
n=314
n=502
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Table A.3
2004 Democratic Primary Comparison Voter Registration/Party ID
7 point scale

Registered
Democrat
Undeclared
Registered Other
Not registered, will
vote

VO
-P'

Strong
Dem

Not
Strong
Dem

Ind
Closer
to Dem

Indep

Ind
Closer
to Rep

Not
Strong
Rep

Strong
Rep

Other
Party

66%
12%
14%

15%
8%
0%

14%
38%
43%

4%
26%
14%

1%
10%
0%

1%
4%
0%

0%
1%
0%

0%
1%
29%

26%

15%

35%

12%

6%

3%

0%

3%

n=1208
Chi Square = 530.836,
Asymp. Sig = 0.000
df = 21
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.

n=559
n=608
n=7
n=34
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Table A.4
2004 Democratic Primary Comparison Party ID/Voter Registration
7 point scale

Strong Democrat
Not Strong Democrat
Ind Closer to Democrat
Independent
Ind Closer to Republican
Not Strong Republican
Strong Republican
Other Party
^

Registered
Democrat
82%
61%
24%
11%
6%
14%
17%
17%

Undeclared
16%
35%
72%
86%
91%
83%
83%
58%

Registered
Other
0%
0%
1%
1%
0%
0%
0%
17%

Not
Registered,
will vote
2%
4%
4%
2%
3%
3%
0%
8%

Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.

n=449
n=135
n=324
n=184
n=69
n=29
n=6
n=12
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APPENDIX B

CROSS-TABULATION DATA - CERTAINTY OF SUPPORT BY DAY

Table B.1
2000 All Partisans by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Certainty of support * DATE OF COMPLETION Crosstabulation
Count
DATE OF COMPLETION
Certainty
of support

Certain to support

Thurs, Jan 20
91

Fri, Jan 21
54

Sat, Jan 22
66

Sun, Jan 23
102

Mon, Jan 24
102

Tues, Jan 25
104

Wed, Jan 26
78

Thurs, Jan 27
83

Fri,Jan 28
71

Sat, Jan 29
104

Sun, Jan 30
109

May change mind

44

22

36

33

39

55

25

37

27

43

7

2

1

8

0

3

0

2

3

2

142

78

103

143

141

162

103

122

101

DK
Total

^

65

Total
1029

29

12

402

5

1

34

149

143

78

1465

19

Total
335
206

12

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 39.081, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .014

ON

Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

Table B.2
2000 Weak Partisans by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Certainty of support * DATE OF COMPLETION Crosstabulation
Count
DATE OF COMPLETION
Certainty
of support

Certain to support

Thurs, Jan 20
31

Fri, Jan 21
12

Sat, Jan 22
26

Sun, Jan 23
37

Mon, Jan 24
41

Tues, Jan 25
31

Wed, Jan 26
19

Thurs, Jan 27
24

Fri, Jan 28
18

Sat, Jan 29
35

Sun, Jan 30
42

May change mind

24

15

17

16

20

22

16

23

10

21

15

7

2

1

0

2

0

0

0

0

2

0

2

1

10

57

28

43

55

61

53

35

47

30

56

59

27

551

DK
Total

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 27.751, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .184
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table B.3
2000 Strong Partisans by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Certainty of support * Date of completion Crosstabulation
Count
Date o f completion
Certainty
of support

Certain to support
May change mind
DK

Total

Thurs, Jan 20
60

Fri, Jan 21
42

Sat, Jan 22
40

Sun, Jan 23
65

Mon, Jan 24
61

Tues, Jan 25
73

Wed, Jan 26
58

Thurs, Jan 27
58

Fri,Jan 28
53

Sat, Jan 29
69

Sun, Jan 30
67

20

7

- 18

16

19

33

9

14

18

22

5

1

1

6

0

3

2

1

2

85

50

59

87

80

109

0
67

74

72

93

Mon, Jan 31
46

Total
692

14

5

195

3

0

24

84

51

911

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 36.062, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .030
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 3 1 ,2 0 0 0 .

Table B.4
2000 All Independents by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
vo
^

Certainty of support * Date of completion Crosstabulation
Count

Certainty
of support

Certain to support
May change mind
DK

Total

Date of completion
Tues, Jan 25 Wed, Jan 26
69
38

Thurs, Jan 20
50

Fri, Jan 21
24

Sat, Jan 22
35

Sun, Jan 23
47

Mon, Jan 24
57

25

16

20

30

35

30

3
78

3
43

3
58

4
81

3
95

3
102

Thurs, Jan 27
53

Fri, Jan 28
51

Sat, Jan 29
68

Sun, Jan 30
62

Mon. Jan 31
50

Total
604

31

32

20

28

26

20

313

3
72

2
87

1
72

3

0
88

2

30

72

947

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 18.679, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .665
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.
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Table B.5
2000 Leaning Independents by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Certainty of support * Date of completion Crosstabulation
Count
Date of completion
Certainty
of support

Certain to support
May change mind
DK

Total

Tues, Jan 25
48

Wed, Jan 26
29

Thurs, Jan 27
31

Fri, Jan 28
38

S a t Jan 29
46

22

Mon, Jan 24
42
24

19

21

20

12

4

2

2

3

2

1

63

68

69

53

53

51

Fri,Jan 21
17

Sat, Jan 22
26

Sun, Jan 23
37

12
1

17

3

2

48

30

45

Thurs, Jan 20
30
15

16

Sun, Jan 30
38
22

Mon, Jan 31
32
14

Total
414

3

0

2

25

65

60

48

653

Fri, Jan 28
13

Sat, Jan 29
22

Sun, Jan 30
24

Mon. Jan 31
18

Total
190
100

214

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 14.982, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .863
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

Table B.6
2000 True Independents by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
00

Certainty of support * Date of completion Crosstabulation
Count
Date of completion
Certainty
of support

Certain to support

Thurs, Jan 20
20

Fri,Jan 21
7

Sat, Jan 22
9

Sun, Jan 23
10

Mon. Jan 24
15

Tues, Jan 25
21

Wed, Jan 26
9

Thurs, Jan 27
22

May change mind

10

4

3

8

11

11

11

12

8

12

4

6

0

2

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

30

13

13

18

27

33

20

34

21

34

28

24

295

DK
Total

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 34.064, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .048
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 3 1 ,2 0 0 0 .
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Table B.7
2000 Registered Partisans Certainty of Support by Day
Certainty of support * DATE OF COMPLETION Crosstabulation
Count
DATE OF COMPLETION
Certainty
of support

33

15

472

5

2

47

163

95

1681

Mon, Jan 24
113

Tues, Jan 25
120

Wed, Jan 26
84

Thurs, Jan 27
93

Fri, Jan 28
84

Sat, Jan 29
122

Sun, Jan 30
125

Certain to support
May change mind

51

34

40

46

65

34

48

32

50

6

4

2

10

1

5

1

4

4

3

159

88

109

158

160

190

119

145

120

175

Total

Total
1162

Sun, Jan 23
108

Fri, Jan 21
60
24

DK

78

Sat, Jan 22
73

Thurs, Jan 20
102

12

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 34.656, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .042
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.

Table B.8
2000 Registered Undeclared Certainty of Support by Day
vo
^

Certainty of support * DATE OF COMPLETION Crosstabulation
Count

Certainty
of support

Certain to support

Fri,Jan 21
20

Sat, Jan 22
32

Sun, Jan 23
42

Mon, Jan 24
49

Tues, Jan 25
53

May change mind

20

15
1

23

26

28

22

4

2

2

1

66

36

57

3
71

79

76

DK
Total

DATE OF COMPLETION
Wed, Jan 26
31

Thurs, Jan 20
42

38

Total
494

22
1

17

258

1

73

56

19
771

Thurs, Jan 27
43

Fri,Jan 28
40

Sat, Jan 29
54

Sun, Jan 30
50

22

22

16

25

2

0

0

2

55

65

56

81

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 16.078, df = 22, Asymp. Sig = .812
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 20 - January 31, 2000.
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Table B.9
2004 All Democrats by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
Cetaintly
of support

11

25

15

22

46

44

42

59

60

Total
338

May change mind

12

9

28

18

23

20

25

20

29

18

202

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

26

21

53

33

45

66

69

62

88

78

541

DK/Not Sure
Total

19

21

22

23

25

14

18

20

24

Certain to support

17

16

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 49.056, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .000
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.

Table B.10
2004 All Weak Democrats by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
16
Cetaintly
of support

Total

17

18

20

19

22

21

24

23

25

Total

Certain to support

1

2

4

2

4

8

6

12

11

8

58

May change mind

3

3

12

8

7

3

6

5

9

7

63

DK/Not Sure

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

5

16

10

11

11

12

17

20

15

121

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 14.859, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .672
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.
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Table B.11
2004 All Strong Democrats by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
17

16
Cetaintly
of support

18

19

21

20

22

24

23

Total

25

Certain to support

13

9

21

13

18

38

38

29

48

52

279

May change mind

9

6

16

10

16

17

19

15

20

12

140

DK/Not Sure

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

22

16

37

23

34

55

57

44

68

64

420

Total

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 38.510, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .003
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.

Table B.12
2004 All Independents by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
17

16
Cetaintly
of support

19

21

20

22

24

Certain to support

11

13

31

25

30

30

42

25

46

48

Total
301

May change mind

12

16

24

24

27

24

35

26

20

17

225

0

0

0

2

1

1

0

0

0

0

4

23

29

55

51

58

55

77

51

66

65

530

DK/Not Sure
Total

18

23

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 28.410, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .056
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.
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Table B.13
2004 Leaning Independents by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day
Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
17

16
Cetaintly
of support

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Total

25

Certain to support

10

8

16

18

17

26

30

19

32

41

217

May change mind

8

10

17

19

17

16

21

23

15

10

156

DK/Not Sure

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

18

18

33

38

34

42

51

42

47

51

374

Total

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 29.298, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .045
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.

Table B.14
2004 Pure Independents by Party ID Certainty of Support by Day

o

ts J

Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Total

25

Cetaintly

Certain to support

1

5

15

6

13

5

12

6

13

8

84

of support

May change mind

4

6

8

5

10

7

14

4

4

7

69

DK/Not Sure

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

3

5

11

23

12

24

13

26

10

17

15

156

Total

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 16.589, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .552
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 2 5 ,2 0 0 4 .
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Table B.15
2004 Registered Democrats Certainty of Support by Day
Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
Certain to support

13

8

24

21

18

46

45

39

59

66

Total
339

May change mind

15

7

27

17

27

18

20

20

25

11

187

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

3

28

16

51

38

46

65

65

59

84

77

529

16
Cetaintly
of support

DK/Not Sure
Total

17

19

18

20

21

22

23

24

25

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 57.899, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .000
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.

Table B.16
2004 Registered Undeclared Certainty of Support by Day
Cetaintly of support * date Crosstabulation
Count
date
16
Cetaintly
of support

Certain to support

10

15

34

25

36

34

38

33

45

47

Total
317

May change mind

10

19

29

27

25

24

42

27

22

24

249

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

20

34

63

52

61

58

80

60

67

71

566

DK/Not Sure
Total

17

19

18

20

21

22

24

23

Chi-Square Tests: Pearson Chi-Square = 12.814, df = 18, Asymp. Sig = .803
Source: UNH Survey Center Tacking Poll conducted January 16 - January 25, 2004.
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